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Increasingly, governmental bodies1 and scholars2—including the 
authors3—have been promoting the integration of adaptive 
management and collaborative planning into regulatory processes 
to address deficiencies in conventional regulatory decision making.  
Adaptive management advocates stress that resource management 
should be more dynamic, changing over time to adjust to new 
information and shifting ecological and social conditions.4  
Proponents of collaborative planning maintain that the best 
management processes involve stakeholders working jointly to 
1. See, e.g., Negotiated Rulemaking Act of 1990, 5 U.S.C. §§ 561–570a (2000) (promoting 
collaborative planning in the federal administrative rulemaking process); Notice of 
Availability of a Final Addendum to the Handbook for Habitat Conservation Planning and 
Incidental Take Permitting Process, 65 Fed. Reg. 35,242, 35,252 (June 1, 2000) (adopting 
U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service (“FWS”) guidance seeking to integrate adaptive management 
and collaborative planning under the Endangered Species Act); U.S. FISH & WILDLIFE SERV., 
STRATEGIC HABITAT CONSERVATION:  THE USFWS FRAMEWORK FOR LANDSCAPE 
CONSERVATION (2008), available at 
http://www.fws.gov/science/doc/SHCFactSheet1008pdf.pdf (adopting “Strategic Habitat 
Conservation” policy framework to promote the use of adaptive management in identified 
priority areas or regions); Office of the Secretary of Interior, Protection and Enhancement 
of Environmental Quality, 43 C.F.R. § 46.145 (2008) (incorporating adaptive management 
into Department of the Interior rules implementing the National Environmental Policy Act); 
Regulatory Reinvention (XL) Pilot Projects, 60 Fed. Reg. 27,282 (May 23, 1995) (setting up 
collaborative planning process for negotiation of Final Project Agreements under the 
Environmental Protection Agency’s Project XL). 
2. See, e.g., Jody Freeman, Collaborative Governance in the Administrative State, 45 UCLA L. 
REV. 1, 21–33 (1997) (proposing a normative model of collaborative governance as a more 
effective and legitimate process for resolving regulatory disputes); J.B. Ruhl, Taking Adaptive 
Management Seriously:  A Case Study of the Endangered Species Act, 52 U. KAN. L. REV. 1249, 1271–
84 (2004); J.B. Ruhl, Regulation by Adaptive Management—Is It Possible?, 7 MINN. J. L. SCI. & 
TECH. 21, 28 n.12 (2005). 
3. See, e.g., Alejandro E. Camacho, Can Regulation Evolve?  Lessons from a Study in 
Maladaptive Management, 55 UCLA L. REV. 293 (2007) [hereinafter Camacho, Can Regulation 
Evolve?]; Alejandro E. Camacho, Mustering the Missing Voices:  A Collaborative Model for Fostering 
Equality, Community Involvement and Adaptive Planning in Land Use Decisions, Installment Two, 24 
STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 269 (2005) [hereinafter Camacho, Mustering the Missing Voices]; Lawrence 
Susskind et al., Integrating Scientific Information, Stakeholder Interests, and Political Concerns in 
Resource and Environmental Planning and Management, in FOSTERING INTEGRATION:  CONCEPTS 
AND PRACTICE IN RESOURCE AND ENVIRONMENTAL MANAGEMENT 181–203 (Kevin S. Hanna & 
D. Scott Slocombe eds., 2007); Herman A. Karl et al., A Dialogue, Not A Diatribe:  Effective 
Integration of Science and Policy Through Joint Fact Finding, 49 ENV’T 20, 22–24 (2007). 
4. Description of the Collaborative Adaptive Management Network, 
http://www.adaptivemanagement.net (last visited Jan. 22, 2010). 
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make decisions, rather than government agencies ordaining 
resource management decisions independently.5  Involving all 
stakeholders from the beginning is likely to lead to more broadly 
supported and thus more successful agreements.6  When 
combined, these two innovations are sometimes referred to as 
collaborative adaptive management (“CAM”).7 
One of the most prominent attempts at CAM involves the 
Department of the Interior’s (“DOI”) decision to rely on CAM, in 
principle, to carry out its responsibilities under the Grand Canyon 
Protection Act of 19928 to monitor the operation of the Glen 
Canyon Dam,9 operate the Dam in compliance with a range of laws 
and regulations,10 and mitigate any significant environmental 
impacts.11  The Act stipulates that a variety of stakeholders—
including several federal agencies, states, power generators, 
recreational users, and environmental organizations—must be 
consulted regarding dam operations.12  An Environmental Impact 
Statement (“EIS”) released in 1995 recommended “adaptive 
management” as the best approach to accomplish these tasks.13  
The 1995 EIS recommended using CAM because of the significant 
uncertainties surrounding the socio-ecological systems involved, as 
well as the importance of learning from practice and ongoing 
research to improve operations over time.14 
Bruce Babbitt, the Secretary of the Interior at the time, 
responded to the 1995 EIS by creating the Glen Canyon Dam 
5. See, e.g., Freeman, supra note 2, at 28–29; Camacho, Can Regulation Evolve?, supra note 
3, at 307, 309–10. 
6. See Thomas C. Beierle & Jerry Cayford, Dispute Resolution as a Method of Public 
Participation, in THE PROMISE AND PERFORMANCE OF ENVIRONMENTAL CONFLICT RESOLUTION 
53, 63–66 (Rosemary O’Leary & Lisa B. Bingham eds., 2003) [hereinafter ENVIRONMENTAL 
CONFLICT RESOLUTION] (discussing the instrumental value of public participation). 
7. See Description of the Collaborative Adaptive Management Network, supra note 4. 
8. Grand Canyon Protection Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-575, §§ 1801–1809, 106 Stat. 
4600 (1992), available at http://www.usbr.gov/uc/rm/amp/legal/gcpa1992.html. 
9. Id. § 1805. 
10. Id. § 1804. 
11. Id. § 1802. 
12. Id. § 1803(b). 
13. U.S. BUREAU OF RECLAMATION, U.S. DEP’T OF THE INTERIOR, FINAL ENVTL. IMPACT 
STATEMENT FOR OPERATION OF GLEN CANYON DAM, COLO. RIVER STORAGE PROJECT, ARIZ. 34–
38 (1995) [hereinafter FINAL EIS], available at 
http://www.usbr.gov/uc/envdocs/eis/gc/gcdOpsFEIS.html. 
14. Id. at 34. 
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Adaptive Management Program (“AMP”).15  At the heart of the 
AMP is the Adaptive Management Working Group (“AMWG”), 
which is a formal federal advisory committee whose charter was 
signed in January 1997.16  In addition to the AMWG, the AMP now 
includes the Technical Working Group (“TWG”), the Grand 
Canyon Monitoring and Research Center (“GCMRC”), and 
Independent Review Panels (“IRP”), and has an annual operating 
budget of approximately eleven million dollars.17 
Many of its public and private participants, as well as observers of 
the decade-old participatory experiment, have described the AMP 
in glowing terms.18  Secretary of the Interior Dirk Kempthorne and 
other key Interior officials identified the AMP as one of the most 
successful examples of adaptive management in America.19  Dr. 
Carl Walters of the University of British Columbia’s Fisheries 
Centre went so far as to suggest that Glen Canyon’s AMP, while not 
perfect, is one of the few successful efforts to implement adaptive 
management.20  Dennis Kubly—the Bureau of Reclamation’s 
program manager for the AMP—offers a more tempered analysis, 
but ultimately points toward the research that has been conducted 
to date as a sign of success.21 
We disagree, and the proof is in the results.22  After thirteen years 
15. Glen Canyon Dam Adaptive Management Program, Background, 
http://www.usbr.gov/uc/rm/amp/background.html (last visited Jan. 22, 2010). 
16. Id. 
17. U.S. BUREAU OF RECLAMATION & U.S. GEOLOGICAL SURVEY, GLEN CANYON DAM 
ADAPTIVE MGMT. PROGRAM BIENNIAL BUDGET AND WORK PLAN, FISCAL YEARS 2010–11 (2009), 
available at http://www.usbr.gov/uc/rm/amp/amwg/mtgs/09aug12/FY10-
11_DraftWorkPlan.pdf. 
18. See, e.g., Michael Gabaldon, Secretary’s Designee, Adaptive Management Work Group, 
Address at the Colorado River Ecosystem Science Symposium (Oct. 25–27, 2005) (“[F]rom 
the perspective of experimentation and reducing uncertainty, the Glen Canyon program is 
one of the most successful in the world.  We have undertaken and accomplished large-scale 
experiments repeatedly . . . . We must not underestimate the difficulty of moving forward 
with these tests within the context of a stakeholder process; the fact that they have occurred 
at all is remarkable.”). 
19. Secretary of the Interior Order No. 3270, Adaptive Management (2007) (“[Adaptive 
management] has proved to be a useful approach in cases such as the Bureau of 
Reclamation’s management of Glen Canyon Dam.”). 
20. Gabaldon, supra note 18. 
21. Dennis M. Kubly, Environmental Protection:  Using Adaptive Management at Glen Canyon 
Dam, HYDRO REV., Oct. 2009, available at http://www.hydroworld.com/index/display/article-
display/9751553848/articles/hydro-review/volume-28/issue-7/articles/environmental-
protection.html. 
22. See infra Part II. 
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and millions of dollars, the AMP has failed to stabilize or otherwise 
improve the quality of the fragile downstream ecosystem.23  
Furthermore, the AMP has been unable to make substantial 
progress toward resolving the significant resource conflicts at the 
heart of the Dam’s operations.24  Kubly notes that for adaptive 
management to succeed, “knowledge must make its way into policy 
decisions that promote a balance between the historical primary 
purposes of Glen Canyon Dam (i.e., water delivery and hydropower 
production) and the more recently considered protection of 
natural resources in the Colorado River ecosystem.”25  This 
fundamentally has not happened, and stakeholders have grown 
restless.26 
What has gone wrong?  The adoption of a collaborative adaptive 
management approach is not the problem.  In fact, CAM is a 
technique well suited for managing the Glen Canyon Dam, and the 
AMP incorporates a number of important innovations, including a 
well-funded research program that has conducted experiments 
providing valuable scientific information about the downstream 
23. A 2006 USGS study suggested that humpback chub populations are stabilizing, and 
that the low summer steady flow experiment from June through August 2000 may be one 
reason.  News Release, Grand Canyon Monitoring and Research Center, Endangered 
Humpback Chub Population in Grand Canyon Stabilizing (Aug. 2006), available at 
http://www.gcmrc.gov/research/humpback_chub/20060802.aspx.  Environmental groups 
counter that it is premature to say that this is a stabilization or recovery, claiming that twice 
as many chub are needed to make that claim.  April Reese, New Experimental Plan for Glen 
Canyon Dam Operations Likely to Fall Short, Critics Say, LAND LETTER, Mar. 8, 2007, available at 
http://www.eenews.net/Landletter/2007/03/08/2.  More recent FWS research also disputes 
that the test flows in 2000 can be given any credit, as recent modeling suggests that the 
increased recruitment took place at least four years earlier.  See STEVEN L. SPANGLE, U.S. FISH 
& WILDLIFE SERV., FINAL BIOLOGICAL OPINION FOR THE OPERATION OF GLEN CANYON DAM 20 
(2008) [hereinafter FINAL BIOLOGICAL OPINION], available at 
http://www.usbr.gov/uc/envdocs/bo/FinalGCDBO2-26-08.pdf; Letter from John Weisheit, 
Conservation Dir., Living Rivers and Colorado Riverkeeper, & Michelle Harrington, Rivers 
Program Dir., Center for Biological Diversity to the Hon. Dirk Kempthorne, Sec’y, U.S. Dep’t 
of the Interior, on Scoping Comments for the Environmental Impact Statement for the 
Long-Term Experiment Plan for the Future Operations of Glen Canyon Dam (Feb. 28, 
2007), available at http://www.livingrivers.org/pdfs/LRletterKempthorneFeb2007.pdf. 
24. The fact that environmental groups have filed several lawsuits indicates a breakdown 
in the AMP as a collaborative instrument for dispute resolution.  See New Suit Filed over Glen 
Canyon Dam, ASSOCIATED PRESS, Dec. 9, 2007, available at 
http://www.deseretnews.com/article/1,5143,695234557,00.html; Shaun McKinnon, Lawsuit 
Targets Arizona Dam; Says Native Fish Near Extinction, ARIZ. REPUBLIC, Feb. 17, 2006, at 1A. 
25. Kubly, supra note 21. 
26. Id. 
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ecosystem.27  The Glen Canyon Dam offers an ideal opportunity for 
the systematic application of collaborative adaptive management, 
especially since scientific uncertainty and disagreements have been 
central to the ongoing acrimony among stakeholders.  If 
implemented effectively, CAM can lead to more sustainable 
management of natural resources and increase public support for 
whatever tradeoffs have to be made among ecological, economic 
development, and social welfare objectives.  By bringing all parties 
to the table, more information—including a clearer presentation of 
the risks associated with managing the area’s resources—can be 
obtained.  When trust is fostered, parties are more open to 
searching for ways of meeting the interests of others rather than 
simply fighting for their personal interests.  CAM can encourage 
careful review of how previous management efforts have and have 
not worked.28 
The problem is that the Glen Canyon Dam AMP has 
implemented CAM ineffectively, largely due to Congress and the 
DOI’s deficient initial design.  Congress abdicated its responsibility 
to provide clear guidance regarding the relative priority of 
competing resource goals and the importance of various program 
components.  Equally importantly, the DOI failed to follow 
commonly identified best practices in collaborative and adaptive 
resource management in structuring the AMP.  Without clear 
direction or a commitment to resolving the ongoing resource 
management conflicts, the AMP missed multiple opportunities 
both to foster agency and stakeholder learning and to cultivate 
constructive engagement of the stakeholders who care the most 
about the Colorado River and the socio-ecological system it 
27. See infra notes 135–37 and 217–18 and accompanying text. 
28. See generally BYRON K. WILLIAMS ET AL., U.S. DEP’T OF THE INTERIOR, ADAPTIVE 
MANAGEMENT:  THE U.S. DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR TECHNICAL GUIDE 2 (2009) 
[hereinafter TECHNICAL GUIDE], available at 
http://www.doi.gov/initiatives/AdaptiveManagement/TechGuide.pdf; ADAPTIVE 
ENVIRONMENTAL ASSESSMENT AND MANAGEMENT (C.S. Holling ed., 1978); KAI N. LEE, 
COMPASS AND GYROSCOPE:  INTEGRATING SCIENCE AND POLITICS FOR THE ENVIRONMENT 
(1993); PANARCHY:  UNDERSTANDING TRANSFORMATIONS IN HUMAN AND NATURAL SYSTEMS 
(Lance H. Gunderson & C.S. Holling eds., 2002); Kai N. Lee, Appraising Adaptive 
Management, 3(2) CONSERVATION ECOLOGY 3 (1999) [hereinafter Lee, Appraising Adaptive 
Mangement], available at http://www.consecol.org/vol3/iss2/art3; Per Olsson et al., Shooting 
the Rapids:  Navigating Transitions to Adaptive Governance of Social-Ecological Systems, 11(1) 
ECOLOGY & SOC’Y 18 (2006), available at 
http://www.ecologyandsociety.org/vol11/iss1/art18. 
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supports. 
Though the Glen Canyon Dam AMP has fallen short of its 
promise, its experience offers important lessons that can guide 
future regulatory innovations.  When Congress or federal agencies 
encourage CAM, they can take steps to help harness the full 
potential of this approach to collaborative governance.  Through 
its shortcomings, the Glen Canyon AMP demonstrates that 
successful CAM requires careful institutional design at the outset 
along with continuing systematic assessment and joint reflection 
among stakeholders throughout the regulatory process. 
In Part I of this article, we introduce the resource conflicts on the 
Colorado River, outline the Glen Canyon Dam’s regulatory setting, 
and explain how the Glen Canyon Dam AMP functions.  In Part II, 
we present persistent problems at Glen Canyon.  In Part III, we 
identify six best practices in collaborative adaptive management 
that the AMP has failed to follow:  (1) identifying appropriate 
stakeholder representatives; (2) involving stakeholders in 
developing a collaborative process; (3) using professional neutrals 
and encouraging consensus building; (4) incorporating joint fact-
finding to deal with scientific uncertainty; (5) producing 
collectively supported written agreements; and (6) committing to 
build long-term management capabilities.  We explain the benefits 
of utilizing each best practice and analyze the extent to which, 
based on available evidence, the Glen Canyon Dam AMP appears to 
fall short in putting the practice to use.  Finally, we conclude by 
suggesting how legislatures and agencies can avoid the Glen 
Canyon Dam AMP’s shortcomings when implementing future 
collaborative adaptive management programs. 
I.  THE COLORADO RIVER’S ENDURING RESOURCE CONFLICT AND THE 
GLEN CANYON DAM 
The Colorado River is the lifeblood of much of the western 
United States, providing water to seven American states and 
Mexico.  What was once a wild river, flowing from the Rocky 
Mountains through parched deserts and the Grand Canyon into 
the Gulf of California, is now heavily utilized and highly regulated.  
The Law of the River29—a collection of statutes, agreements, 
29. The “Law of the River,” a collection of “numerous compacts, federal laws, court 
decisions and decrees, contracts, and regulatory guidelines,” governs the use and 
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1572720
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regulations, and numerous court decisions—dictates how the river 
will be managed, including how water will be allocated among the 
various users and territories. 
To improve management and storage of water from the river, the 
Bureau of Reclamation constructed the Glen Canyon Dam above 
Lee’s Ferry, Arizona and created Lake Powell between 1956 and 
1963.30  The total cost of the project was $314 million.31  This 
location was chosen because Lee’s Ferry marks an important 
division between the upper and lower basins of the Colorado 
River—the upper being the States of Colorado, New Mexico, Utah, 
and Wyoming, and the lower being Arizona, California, and 
Nevada.  Each basin is entitled to 7.5 million acre-feet of water each 
year under the Colorado River Compact of 1922.32  That leaves 1.5 
management of the Colorado River among the seven basin states and Mexico.  U.S. Bureau 
of Reclamation, Law of the River, http://www.usbr.gov/lc/region/g1000/lawofrvr.html (last 
visited Jan. 22, 2010).  See, e.g., Colorado River Compact, 70 CONG. REC. 324, 324–25 (1928), 
available at http://www.usbr.gov/lc/region/g1000/pdfiles/crcompct.pdf; Boulder Canyon 
Project Act, ch. 42, 45 Stat. 1057 (1928) (codified as amended at 43 U.S.C. §§ 617–617t 
(2006)); Boulder Canyon Project, Agreement Requesting Apportionment of California’s 
Share of the Colorado River Among the Applicants in the State (the “Seven Party 
Agreement”), Aug. 18, 1931, available at 
http://www.usbr.gov/lc/region/g1000/pdfiles/ca7pty.pdf; Utilization of Waters of the 
Colorado and Tijuana Rivers and of the Rio Grande, U.S.-Mex., Nov. 8, 1945, T.S. 994 
[hereinafter Water Utilization Treaty], available at 
http://www.usbr.gov/lc/region/g1000/pdfiles/mextrety.pdf; Upper Colorado River Basin 
Compact of 1948, art. IV, Apr. 16, 1949, 63 Stat. 31, available at 
http://www.usbr.gov/lc/region/g1000/pdfiles/ucbsnact.pdf; Colorado River Storage 
Project Act, ch. 203, 70 Stat. 105 (1956) (codified as amended at 43 U.S.C. §§ 620–620o 
(2006)), available at http://www.usbr.gov/lc/region/g1000/pdfiles/crspuc.pdf; Arizona v. 
California, 373 U.S. 546 (1963); Colorado River Basin Project Act (Lower Colorado River 
Basin Project Act), 82 Stat. 885 (1968) (codified as amended at 43 U.S.C. §§ 1501–1556 
(2008)), available at http://www.usbr.gov/lc/region/g1000/pdfiles/crbproj.pdf; Criteria for 
Coordinated Long-Range Operation of Colorado River Reservoirs Pursuant to the Colorado 
River Basin Project Act of September 30, 1968 (P.L. 90-537), 35 Fed. Reg. 8951 (June 5, 
1970), available at http://www.usbr.gov/lc/region/g1000/pdfiles/opcriter.pdf; INT’L 
BOUNDARY & WATER COMMISSION, U.S. & MEX., MINUTE NO. 242, PERMANENT & DEFINITIVE 
SOLUTION TO THE INTERNATIONAL PROBLEM OF THE SALINITY OF THE COLORADO RIVER  
(1973), available at http://www.usbr.gov/lc/region/g1000/pdfiles/min242.pdf; Colorado 
River Basin Salinity Control Act, 88 Stat. 266 (1974) (codified as amended at 43 U.S.C. 
§§1571–1599). 
30. U.S. Bureau of Reclamation, Glen Canyon Dam Construction History, 
http://www.usbr.gov/uc/rm/crsp/gc/history.html (last visited Jan. 22, 2010). 
31. This includes the cost of dam and power plant construction, as well as related 
infrastructure, including the construction of the town of Page, Arizona.  U.S. Geological 
Survey, Statistics About Glen Canyon Dam, 
http://3dparks.wr.usgs.gov/glca/html/glen1860.htm (last visited Jan. 22, 2010). 
32. U.S. Bureau of Reclamation, Lower Colorado Region, Law of the River, 
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million acre-feet for Mexico, in accordance with the Mexican Water 
Treaty of 1944.33  The Dam allows the upper basin to meet its treaty 
obligations by releasing nine million acre-feet while holding back 
its share.34  The Bureau of Reclamation can store water in Lake 
Powell—and Lake Mead downstream—and release it when 
necessary to smooth out the Colorado’s significant year-over-year 
variability in flow and ameliorate the impacts of droughts.35  As 
detailed in this Part, in light of the various stakeholders with 
diverging interests in the Dam’s operation, as well as the wide 
range of often conflicting laws that influence the management of 
the Dam and the surrounding natural resources, Congress 




http://www.usbr.gov/lc/region/g1000/lawofrvr.html (last visited Jan. 22, 2010). 
33. Water Utilization Treaty, supra note 29, art. 10, ¶ (a). 
34.  GLEN CANYON DAM ADAPTIVE MGMT. WORK GROUP, U.S. DEP’T OF THE INTERIOR, 
GLEN CANYON DAM ADAPTIVE MANAGEMENT PROGRAM:  AMWG FACA COMMITTEE GUIDANCE 
(2000), available at 
http://www.usbr.gov/uc/rm/amp/amwg/mtgs/00jan20/Attach_07b.pdf. 
35. Glen Canyon Dam Adaptive Management Program, Water Storage and Delivery, 
http://www.gcdamp.gov/keyresc/waterSD.html (last visited Jan. 22, 2010). 
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SOURCE:  Map of Glen Canyon Dam, 
http://walrus.wr.usgs.gov/grandcan/images/map.gif (last visited Jan. 24, 
2010). 
A.  The Stakeholders 
In addition to operating the Dam to ensure that obligations 
under the Law of the River are met, other competing 
considerations influence how the Dam is operated.  First, while the 
primary purpose of constructing the Glen Canyon Dam was to 
regulate the flow of the river, a secondary objective has always been 
to generate hydroelectric power.36  Revenue from power sales is 
paying off the Dam’s construction debt, albeit slowly.37  Operating 
the Dam optimally for hydroelectric power generation requires 
fluctuating water releases throughout the course of each day, 
depending on demand.38  Second, some advocate for operating the 
Dam in a manner that alleviates environmental impacts.  Over 
time, concerns arose regarding the Dam’s impacts on the 
environment and endangered species such as the humpback chub.  
Traditionally, the Colorado swelled in the spring with sediment-
laden snowmelt, then receded in the summer, depositing the 
sediment and replenishing sandbars in the process.39  Species 
indigenous to the area, including the humpback chub, adapted to 
these conditions over time.40  The operations regime favored by 
hydroelectric interests and used in practice disrupts these natural 
conditions:  water is impounded, making it cooler and allowing the 
sediment to settle, then released through turbines in fluctuations 
defined by electricity needs.41  Conservationists have, therefore, 
36. 43 U.S.C. § 620 (2006). 
37. Glen Canyon Dam Adaptive Management Program, Frequently Asked Questions, 
http://www.gcdamp.gov/faq.html (last visited Jan. 22, 2010); Glen Canyon Institute, 
Frequently Asked Questions About Restoring Glen Canyon, 
http://www.glencanyon.org/aboutgci/faq.php (last visited Jan. 22, 2010). 
38. Glen Canyon Dam Adaptive Management Program, Hydropower, 
http://www.gcdamp.gov/keyresc/hydropower.html (last visited Jan. 22, 2010) [hereinafter 
Hydropower]. 
39. MARK T. ANDERSON ET AL., U.S. GEOLOGICAL SURVEY, CONTROLLED FLOODING OF THE 
COLORADO RIVER IN GRAND CANYON:  THE RATIONALE AND DATA-COLLECTION PLANNED 
(1996), available at http://water.usgs.gov/wid/FS_089-96/FS_089-96.pdf. 
40. GLEN CANYON DAM ADAPTIVE MGMT. PROGRAM, HISTORICAL NATIVE FISHES OF GLEN 
AND GRAND CANYONS 1 (2006), available at http://www.gcdamp.gov/fs/histNF.pdf. 
41. Glen Canyon Dam Adaptive Management Program, Sediment and River Sand Bars in 
the Grand Canyon, http://www.gcdamp.gov/keyresc/sediment.html (last visited Jan. 22, 
2010); Hydropower, supra note 38. 
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called for changes in water releases aimed at ameliorating these 
impacts, including slower ramping rates and high-flow releases in 
spring.42  Finally, groups with other interests—such as sport fishing, 
whitewater rafting, other recreational interests, and protecting 
cultural sites—influence how the Dam should be operated. 
The Bureau of Reclamation and the states are interested 
primarily in the water storage services the Dam provides.43  Their 
overriding objectives are to meet the demand for water in the arid 
southwest and fulfill their obligations under the Law of the River.44  
Lake Powell, the reservoir behind Glen Canyon Dam, stores more 
than 26.2 million acre-feet of water and provides consistent flows to 
downstream withdrawers even in times of drought.45  Lowering the 
reservoir or removing the Dam altogether for environmental 
reasons could negatively impact storage and usage capabilities, 
particularly for the upper basin states.46  The water stored in Lake 
Powell created by Glen Canyon Dam “serves as a ‘bank account’ 
42. April Reese, Colorado River Adaptive Management Program Needs Overhaul, Critics Say, 
LAND LETTER, May 7, 2009, available at 
http://www.eenews.net/public/Landletter/2009/05/07/1. 
43. See generally GLEN CANYON DAM ADAPTIVE MGMT. WORK GROUP, U.S. DEP’T OF THE 
INTERIOR, MEETING MINUTES 1997–PRESENT [hereinafter MEETING MINUTES], available at 
http://www.usbr.gov/uc/rm/amp/mtgmin.html (select desired meeting date from either 
“Select 2006–2010 Meeting Date” or “Archive:  1997–2005” drop-down menus; then follow 
“Draft Meeting Minutes” hyperlink).  For example, at the August 9–11, 2004 AMWG 
meeting, Tom Ryan, a Bureau of Reclamation employee, reported that “the big concern in 
the basin continues to be the drought,” but that they were working with basin states to 
analyze options and develop contingency plans.  See GLEN CANYON DAM ADAPTIVE MGMT. 
WORK GROUP, U.S. DEP’T OF THE INTERIOR, MINUTES OF AUG. 9–11, 2004 MEETING 15 (2004) 
[hereinafter FINAL MEETING MINUTES AUGUST 2004], available at 
http://www.usbr.gov/uc/rm/amp/amwg/mtgs/04aug09/Final_Mins.pdf.  At the same 
meeting, representatives of Colorado and Nevada voiced opposition to the implementation 
of experimental floods in Water Year 2005 because of the drought conditions.  See id. at 17. 
44.  See, e.g., FINAL MEETING MINUTES AUGUST 2004, supra note 43, at 17. 
45. See U.S. Bureau of Reclamation, Upper Colorado Region:  Colorado River Storage 
Project, http://www.usbr.gov/uc/rm/crsp/gc/index.html (last visited Jan. 22, 2010); 
COMMITTEE ON THE SCIENTIFIC BASES OF COLORADO RIVER BASIN WATER MGMT. ET AL., 
COLORADO RIVER BASIN WATER MANAGEMENT:  EVALUATING AND ADJUSTING TO 
HYDROCLIMATIC VARIABILITY 36 (2007) [hereinafter COLORADO RIVER BASIN WATER MGMT. 
ET AL.], available at http://www.nap.edu/catalog.php?record_id=11857 (“With a reservoir 
comparable in size to Lake Mead, storage provided by Lake Powell helps ensure that the 
upper basin states meet their water delivery obligations to the lower basin.”). 
46. Ronald K. Christensen, The Proposed Draining of Lake Powell:  An Inequitable 
Taking of Upper Colorado River Basin States Rights 39–42 (2000), available at 
http://www.riversimulator.org/Resources/Controversy/DrainingPowellInequitableChristens
en2000.pdf. 
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that can be drawn on in times of drought.”47  This stored water has 
made it possible to meet the needs of cities, industries, and 
agriculture throughout the West during dry periods.48 
The Bureau of Reclamation, the states, the Western Area Power 
Administration, and the contractors that purchase power are also 
concerned about maximizing power generation.49  The Dam is an 
important source of power for the region, producing 
approximately 4.5 billion kilowatt-hours annually, which offsets 
about 2.5 million tons of coal or eleven million barrels of oil.50  The 
“controlled floods” advocated by some conservation and recreation 
interests lower the Dam’s power generating potential.51  Any 
changes to the permitted ramping rate (i.e., the speed at which 
releases change) or seasonal and/or daily restrictions also undercut 
power generation.52 
Environmental organizations, including the Sierra Club, opposed 
47. U.S. Bureau of Reclamation, supra note 45. 
48. Id. 
49. See Hydropower, supra note 38; FINAL MEETING MINUTES AUGUST 2004, supra note 43.  
For example, at the August 9–11, 2004 meeting, the issue of maintaining a healthy basin 
fund—the pool of funds generated by hydroelectric generation used to pay for the AMP—
was raised in defense of forgoing experimental high flow releases.  Id. 
50. U.S. Bureau of Reclamation, Colorado River Storage Project, Frequently Asked 
Questions About Glen Canyon Dam, http://www.usbr.gov/uc/rm/crsp/gc/faq.html (last 
visited Jan. 22, 2010). 
51. Controlled flows undercut power generation.  Flows can be managed to maximize 
profit by responding to shifting changes in electricity prices, but the flows required to 
achieve these goals are not necessarily the flows that ensure maximum environmental 
protection.  Furthermore, during controlled high flows, water is released via bypass tubes, 
representing lost generation capacity.  Hydropower, supra note 38.  According to Western 
Area Power Administration projections, the total cost of purchasing power elsewhere to 
compensate for reduced generation during the 2008 high flow test year was estimated to be 
$4.1 million.  U.S. BUREAU OF RECLAMATION, U.S. DEP’T OF THE INTERIOR, FINAL 
ENVIRONMENTAL ASSESSMENT FOR EXPERIMENTAL RELEASES FROM GLEN CANYON DAM, ARIZ., 
2008 THROUGH 2012 6 (2008) [hereinafter FINAL ENVIRONMENTAL ASSESSMENT], available at 
http://www.usbr.gov/uc/envdocs/ea/gc/2008hfe/GCD-finalEA2-29-08.pdf.  This 
represented a 9.4% increase in the amount required to purchase power.  Id. at 37. 
52. Hydropower supra note 38; GLEN CANYON DAM ADAPTIVE MGMT. WORK GROUP, U.S. 
DEP’T OF THE INTERIOR, FINAL MINUTES OF APRIL 29–30, 2009 MEETING 14 (2009) 
[hereinafter FINAL MEETING MINUTES APRIL 2009], available at 
http://www.usbr.gov/uc/rm/amp/amwg/mtgs/09apr29/Final_Minutes.pdf (“If you 
equalize the months, it causes us to be short of power to meet our contracts during those 
peak months and it will cause us to be long on power in the off-peak months.  [We] would 
have to buy from the market in order to meet the contracts and peak months our prices tend 
to be higher and in the off-peak months we will be long on power.  We will be selling the 
excess off in times when prices are down because they are off-peak months.  So this would 
have a definite financial impact to power.”). 
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the initial plan for what was to become the Colorado River Storage 
Project Act of 1956, which called for a series of dams along the 
Colorado River, including two in Dinosaur National Monument.53  
The Sierra Club’s primary concern at the time was that “no major 
scenic resource should be sacrificed for a power project.”54  The 
Sierra Club eventually dropped its opposition to the Colorado 
River Storage Project Act, including the Glen Canyon Dam, in 
exchange for project modifications that canceled the two upstream 
dams at Echo Park and Split Mountain in Dinosaur National 
Monument.55  Many environmentalists came to regret this 
acquiescence.56  Indeed, in light of concerns about the impact of 
the Dam on the environment and endangered species, 
environmental groups have challenged the Dam’s existence and 
management ever since.57 
There are eight endangered and three threatened species in the 
area:  four of the endangered species—the southwestern willow 
flycatcher, humpback chub, razorback sucker, and Kanab 
ambersnail—have been adversely affected by dam operations.58  
53. 43 U.S.C. §§ 620–620o (2006); David R. Brower, Let the River Run Through It, 82 SIERRA 
MAG. 42 (1997), available at http://www.sierraclub.org/sierra/199703/brower.asp. 
54. Brower, supra note 53. 
55. Echo Park and Split Mountain would have inundated Dinosaur National Monument, 
a protected area and natural treasure already being visited by thousands annually in the 
1950s.  Glen Canyon was less appreciated because it was not well known.  See, e.g., Mark W.T. 
Harvey, Echo Park, Glen Canyon, and the Postwar Wilderness Movement, 60 PAC. HIST. REV. 43, 44 
(Feb. 1991) (“There had been relatively little concern about the beauties of Glen Canyon 
during the debate over the [Colorado River Storage Project], in part because only a handful 
of people had seen the canyon.”); MARK W.T. HARVEY, A SYMBOL OF WILDERNESS:  ECHO PARK 
AND THE AMERICAN CONSERVATION MOVEMENT 222 (1994) (“A generation of 
environmentalists became so enchanted with Glen Canyon and the surrounding landscape 
of the Colorado Plateau [in the aftermath of the Echo Park controversy] that much has been 
forgotten about its obscurity in the early 1950s.  At the time of the controversy over Echo 
Park, Glen Canyon remained largely unknown but for a handful of river runners in Utah.”). 
56. For example, Sierra Club executive director and Friends of the Earth founder David 
Brower later stated, “Glen Canyon died in 1963 and I was partly responsible for its needless 
death . . . . Neither you nor I, nor anyone else, knew it well enough to insist that at all costs it 
should endure.  When we began to find out it was too late.”  David R. Brower, Foreword to 
ELIOT PORTER, THE PLACE NO ONE KNEW:  GLEN CANYON ON THE COLORADO 8 (David R. 
Brower ed., commemorative ed., Peregrine Smith Books 1988) (1963). 
57. National Wildlife Fed’n v. W. Area Power Admin., No. 88-C-11750 (C.D. Utah Sept. 
29, 1989) (order granting injunction), available at 
http://www.riversimulator.org/Resources/Legal/GCD/NWFinjuntion1989.pdf, which led to 
the creation of the AMP in the first place, is one of the lawsuits filed by environmental 
organizations challenging the operation of the Glen Canyon Dam. 
58. Glen Canyon Dam Adaptive Management Program, Endangered Species, 
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The humpback chub and razorback sucker are of particular 
interest because they are found only in the Colorado River Basin.59  
Despite a recent stabilization in the estimated chub population,60 
their current numbers are much lower than they were before the 
river was heavily modified.61  According to conservationists, a 
number of changes caused by building the Dam present challenges 
to these endangered species, including decreased sediment load, 
cooler and more constant temperatures, more constant flows 
rather than natural seasonal variation, beach and bar erosion, and 
the arrival of invasive species.62 
Environmentalists also argue that the water storage services the 
dam provides are not particularly valuable, given that sufficient 
storage capacity exists elsewhere in the system and that a staggering 
volume is lost to evaporation from Lake Powell annually.63  
Recognizing that outright removal of the Dam is unlikely, 
environmental organizations and other conservation interests, 
including the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service, advocate flow 
modifications, like controlled flood releases and restricted ramping 
rates.64  Such modified flow regimes would be designed to restore 
and maintain the habitat and other conditions essential for species 
like the humpback chub.65  Modified flow regimes, however, often 
conflict with water supply and power interests.66 
The area around Glen Canyon remains only sparsely populated; 
http://www.gcdamp.gov/keyresc/es.html (last visited Jan. 22, 2010) [hereinafter 
Endangered Species]. 
59. Id. 
60. MATTHEW E. ANDERSEN, U.S. GEOLOGICAL SURVEY, FACT SHEET 2009-3035:  STATUS 
AND TRENDS OF THE GRAND CANYON POPULATION OF HUMPBACK CHUB 2 (2009), available at 
http://pubs.usgs.gov/fs/2009/3035/fs2009-3035.pdf. 
61. Id.; Upper Colorado River Endangered Fish Recovery Program, 
http://www.fws.gov/coloradoriverrecovery/Index.htm (last visited Jan. 22, 2010). 
62. Endangered Species, supra note 58. 
63. Scott K. Miller, Undamming Glen Canyon:  Lunacy, Rationality, or Prophecy?, 19 STAN. 
ENVTL. L.J. 121, 174–75 (2000). 
64. For example, during the August 2007 AMWG meeting, an environmental group 
representative with the support of the Fish and Wildlife Service and the National Park 
Service recommended that the Secretary implement seasonally-adjusted steady flows in 2008.  
However, few other members agreed.  GLEN CANYON DAM ADAPTIVE MGMT. WORK GROUP, 
U.S. DEP’T OF THE INTERIOR, MINUTES OF AUG. 29–30, 2007 MEETING 10–11 (2007) 
[hereinafter FINAL MEETING MINUTES AUGUST 2007], available at 
http://www.usbr.gov/uc/rm/amp/amwg/mtgs/07aug29/Final_Mins.pdf. 
65. See Recovery of Upper Colorado River Basin Fish:  Protecting Stream Flows, Part 1, 
http://www.fws.gov/coloradoriverrecovery/Crrpflo1.htm (last visited Jan. 22, 2010). 
66. Hydropower, supra note 38; FINAL MEETING MINUTES APRIL 2009, supra note 52. 
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with no roads and a harsh landscape, the area contained even fewer 
residents when the Dam was proposed.67  It is the traditional 
territory of the Havasupi, Hopi, Hualapi, Navajo, Pueblo, and 
Southern Paiute tribes, who attach great religious and cultural 
significance to sites within the canyons and along the river.68  It 
appears, however, that there was little opposition from the tribes at 
the time of construction, perhaps because the Dam brought 
tangible economic benefits in the form of employment 
opportunities, and the Navajo Nation was compensated for the 
land it lost.69 
Overall, the impacts of the Dam on tribes have been mixed.  The 
Dam and associated tourism are a major source of income for the 
Navajo Nation and other tribes;70 however, the flooding of the 
canyon,71 the erosion resulting from the modified downstream 
flow,72 and tourism73 have harmed important sacred and historical 
sites.74  Beyond specific places of historical and cultural significance 
that have been impacted, various zones, vistas, and the general 
67. Shaun McKinnon, At Age 50, Dam Still Generates Love, Hate, ARIZ. REPUBLIC, May 28, 
2007, available at http://www.azcentral.com/arizonarepublic/news/articles/0528dam-
anniversary0528.html. 
68. GLEN CANYON DAM ADAPTIVE MGMT. WORK GROUP, U.S. DEP’T OF THE INTERIOR, 
CULTURAL RESOURCES FACT SHEET 2 (2006) [hereinafter CULTURAL RESOURCES FACT 
SHEET], available at http://www.gcdamp.gov/fs/cultResc.pdf. 
69. See H.R. REP. No. 2789 (1956), available at 
http://water.library.arizona.edu/body.1_div.18.html. 
70. See Senate Concurrent Memorial 1002, 43d Leg., 1st Reg. Sess. (Ariz. 2001) 
(“Whereas, the Navajo Nation is concerned that the breaching of Glen Canyon Dam and the 
draining of Lake Powell would wreak disaster on the economic and social welfare of the 
Navajo Nation and would detrimentally and fundamentally alter the water preservation, 
delivery and supply system crafted by many decades of planning . . . .”), available at 
http://www.azleg.state.az.us/legtext/45leg/1r/bills/scm1002p.pdf. 
71. See Richard Ingebretsen, History of Glen Canyon and the Glen Canyon Institute, 
http://www.glencanyon.org/library/articles/presaccount.php (last visited Jan. 22, 2010). 
72. Jeffrey W. Jacobs & James L. Wescoat, Jr., Managing River Resources:  Lessons from Glen 
Canyon Dam, 44(2) ENV’T 8, 11 (2002). 
73. See Amy Corbin, Sacred Land Film Project:  Rainbow Bridge, 
http://www.sacredland.org/index.php/rainbow-bridge/ (last visited Jan. 22, 2010) 
(explaining the damaging effects of tourism on Lake Powell); Group’s Challenge to Sacred Site 
Policy Rejected, INDIANZ.COM, Mar. 31, 2004, http://indianz.com/News/archive/000949.asp 
(“Several tribes, including the Navajo Nation and the Hopi Tribe, consider Rainbow Bridge 
to be an important religious site that people should not approach for fear of upsetting the 
balance of life.”). 
74. COMMITTEE ON GRAND CANYON MONITORING AND RESEARCH & NATIONAL RESEARCH 
COUNCIL, DOWNSTREAM:  ADAPTIVE MANAGEMENT OF GLEN CANYON DAM AND THE COLORADO 
RIVER ECOSYSTEM 23 (1999) [hereinafter DOWNSTREAM], available at 
http://books.nap.edu/catalog.php?record_id=9590. 
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attributes of the region are considered culturally important, and 
even sacred, by both Native American groups and non-native 
groups in the area, and these vistas and attributes have been altered 
as a result of the Dam’s construction.75 
Over the years, other groups, such as anglers and rafters, have 
taken interest in the River, the Dam, and water resource 
management.  A vibrant sport fishery has grown out of the trout 
that thrive in the cool, clear waters released from the Dam.76  
Anglers from around the world come to the Lee’s Ferry area to fish 
for rainbow trout in the fast-flowing river.77  While initially stocked, 
this fishery is now self-sustaining.78  It is, however, managed as a 
“blue ribbon” fishing experience.79  Anglers benefit from the Dam’s 
operations because the conditions are conducive to the trout 
fishery.80  Rafting brings an estimated $83 million into the local 
economy annually, generating approximately 600 jobs.81  While 
rafters generally benefit from the constant flow the Dam releases 
year-round, this flow and the Dam’s trapping of sediment are 
eroding the beaches that serve as important launch and rest points 
for the rafting industry.82  Boating and recreation in and around 
Lake Powell are also important tourism draws; the Glen Canyon 
National Recreation Area receives approximately two million 
visitors annually.83 
The animosity among these stakeholders has increased over time, 
as their positions regarding releases have hardened and each has 
felt increasingly threatened by the demands of others. Though 
perhaps popular when approved, large dams like the Glen Canyon 
Dam have become controversial and politically unattractive.  
75. CULTURAL RESOURCES FACT SHEET, supra note 68, at 2. 
76. Glen Canyon Dam Adaptive Management Program, Lees [sic] Ferry Trout Fishery, 
http://www.gcdamp.gov/keyresc/tf.html (last visited Jan. 22, 2010). 
77. Id. 
78. Id. 
79. A “blue ribbon” fishery is managed to provide a high quality experience for anglers, 
including larger fish and a high catch rate; such fisheries promote tourism.  Id. 
80. Id. 
81. Glen Canyon Dam Adaptive Management Program, Whitewater Recreation—
Colorado River in Grand Canyon, http://www.gcdamp.gov/keyresc/wr.html (last visited Jan. 
22, 2010). 
82. Id. 
83. Press Release, Glen Canyon National Recreation Area, 2007 Budget and Annual 
Performance Plan for Glen Canyon and Rainbow Bridge Available for Public Review (June 
20, 2007), available at http://www.nps.gov/glca/parknews/upload/07-16%20budget.pdf. 
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Senator Barry Goldwater of Arizona, once a strong supporter of the 
Glen Canyon Dam, later reflected:  “I have to be honest with you.  
I’d be happier if we didn’t have the lake.  I’d vote against it.  I’ve 
become convinced that, while water is important, particularly for 
those of us who live in the desert, it’s not that important.”84  
Additionally, serious conflicts have arisen regarding management 
of the Colorado River more generally as population growth, 
economic development, and climate change have exacerbated 
water scarcity, increased electricity demand, and compounded 
environmental impacts.85  Climate change threatens to magnify the 
problem in the longer term if it reduces stream flow as predicted.86 
The following table summarizes the primary interests of the 
stakeholder groups involved in the AMP as reflected in their legal 
mandates and stated interests.87  Each stakeholder group or agency 
gets one vote unless otherwise noted (i.e., each of the seven states 
84. McKinnon, supra note 67. 
85. COLORADO RIVER BASIN WATER MGMT. ET AL., supra note 45, at 17 (“The legal and 
physical infrastructure for managing Colorado River water resources was designed to help 
address or ameliorate conflicts [among different water users], in part by creating systems to 
store water during wet periods so that demands during drought can be reliably met.”). 
86. Id. at 19 (“Global climate models that project warmer future temperatures—and, in 
turn, increased rates of evapotranspiration—have important implications for runoff, water 
storage, and water planning decisions.”). 
87. See generally U.S. Bureau of Reclamation, About Us, 
http://www.usbr.gov/main/about/ (last visited Jan. 22, 2010); U.S. Dep’t of the Interior, 
Indian Affairs, What We Do, http://www.bia.gov/WhatWeDo/index.htm (last visited Jan. 22, 
2010); U.S. Fish & Wildlife Service, FWS at a Glance, http://www.fws.gov/fwsataglance.html 
(last visited Jan. 22, 2010); National Park Service, About Us, 
http://www.nps.gov/aboutus/index.htm (last visited Jan. 22, 2010); U.S. Dep’t of the 
Interior, Western Area Power Administration, About Western, 
http://www.wapa.gov/about/default.htm (last visited Jan. 22, 2010); Arizona Game & Fish 
Dep’t, Inside AZGFD, http://www.azgfd.gov/inside_azgfd/inside_azgfd.shtml (last visited 
Jan. 22, 2010); Inter Tribal Council of Arizona, Hopi Tribe, Introductory Information, 
http://www.itcaonline.com/tribes_hopi.html (last visited Jan. 22, 2010); Inter Tribal Council 
of Arizona, Haulapai Tribe, Introductory Information, 
http://www.itcaonline.com/tribes_hualapai.html (last visited Jan. 22, 2010); Official Site of 
the Navajo Nation, Introduction, http://www.navajo.org/history.htm (last visited Jan. 22, 
2010); Inside the Wildlands Council, Our Mission, Goals, & Strategy, 
http://www.grandcanyonwildlands.org/insideMission.html (last visited Jan. 22, 2010); Grand 
Canyon Trust, About Us, http://www.grandcanyontrust.org/about.php (last visited Jan. 22, 
2010); Grand Canyon River Guides, About Us, http://www.gcrg.org/aboutus.php (last 
visited Jan. 22, 2010); Federation of Fly Fishers, Our History & Mission, 
http://www.fedflyfishers.org/ (last visited Jan. 22, 2010); Colorado River Energy Distributors 
Association, About Us, http://www.creda.org/Pages/Who.html (last visited Jan. 22, 2010); 
Utah Associated Municipal Power Systems, About UAMPS, 
http://www.uamps.com/index.php/about-uamps (last visited Jan. 22, 2010). 
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gets a vote, as do each of the environmental groups).  These 
general views may vary from issue to issue, and certain stakeholder 
groups may split internally on a specific issue (e.g., though the 
states often agree, their interests on a particular matter may 





Stakeholder group/agency Mandate 
U.S. Bureau of Reclamation Hydroelectric power generation 
and water extraction 
U.S. Bureau of Indian Affairs Provide services to and manage 
land in trust for American Indian 
tribes 
U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service Natural resource management 
U.S. National Park Service Natural resource management 
Western Area Power Administration Hydroelectric power generation 
Arizona Game and Fish 
Department 
Natural resource management 
Tribes (X 6) Protect the interests and enhance 
the wellbeing of tribe members, 
including fostering economic 
opportunities, protecting cultural 
tradition, and maintaining a 
healthy environment 
States (X 7) Water extraction and hydroelectric 
power generation 
Environmental groups (X 2) Nature conservation 
Recreation groups (X 2) Recreation  
Power purchasers (X 2) Hydroelectric power generation 
 
B.  The Regulatory Setting 
The Bureau of Reclamation operates the Glen Canyon Dam in 
accordance with the Colorado River Storage Project Act of 1956.  
This law authorized construction of the Glen Canyon Dam—along 
with other dams, reservoirs, power plants, and transmission 
infrastructure in the upper Colorado basin—and enumerates the 
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Dam’s water management and power generation goals.88 The 
Bureau of Reclamation, a division of the DOI, was created in 1902 
to promote settlement and economic development in the West by 
facilitating the capture and delivery of water to meet the needs of 
farmers and communities.89  Today, it is the largest water 
wholesaler in the country, and the second largest producer of 
hydroelectric power in the Western states.90  The Bureau’s mission 
has evolved to recognize the various benefits and costs associated 
with its work of regulating rivers.  Today, its declared goal is “to 
manage, develop, and protect water and related resources in an 
environmentally and economically sound manner in the interest of 
the American public.”91  Fulfilling this mission involves making 
difficult choices regarding how dams like Glen Canyon Dam should 
be operated to balance a variety of interests and comply with 
numerous re
The regulations governing the Dam’s management have changed 
over time, reflecting both shifting interests among stakeholders 
and increased scientific understanding.  Perhaps as a result, the 
multiple, and often conflicting, laws and directives governing the 
operation of the Dam establish no clear prioritization among the 
various competing usage demands.92  The only cultural or 
environmental stipulation in the Colorado River Storage Project 
Act of 1956 is that the Secretary of the Interior must “take adequate 
protective measures to preclude impairment of the Rainbow Bridge 
National Monument.”93  Various environmental and cultural 
preservation acts passed in subsequent years—particularly the 
National Historic Preservation Act (1966), the National 
88. 43 U.S.C. § 620 (2006). 
89. U.S. Bureau of Reclamation, About Us, http://www.usbr.gov/main/about (last visited 
Jan. 22, 2010). 
90. Id. 
91. U.S. Bureau of Reclamation, Mission Statement, 
http://www.usbr.gov/main/about/mission.html (last visited Jan. 22, 2010). 
92. Alejandro E. Camacho, Beyond Conjecture:  Learning About Ecosystem Management from the 
Glen Canyon Dam Experiment, 8 NEV. L.J. 942, 947–49 (2008) [hereinafter Camacho, Beyond 
Conjecture] (explaining how the circular and confusing requirements of the Grand Canyon 
Protection Act of 1992 have led to conflicting and ineffective regulations governing the 
operation of the dam). 
93. 43 U.S.C. § 620 (2006).  In 1974, Navajo tribe members filed a lawsuit alleging that 
Lake Powell’s rising waters were impacting the site of Rainbow Bridge, but the court ruled 
against the tribe, stating that water storage needs outweighed their concerns.  National Park 
Service, History & Culture of Rainbow Bridge National Monument, 
http://www.nps.gov/rabr/historyculture (last visited Jan. 22, 2010). 
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Environmental Policy Act (1969), and the Endangered Species Act 
(1973)—have had major implications for the Dam’s operation.  For 
example, the Endangered Species Act explicitly protects the 
humpback chub, which the Dam has impacted adversely.94  This 
statutory protection has been the foundation of numerous lawsuits 
and biological opinions filed over the past few decades.95 
In 1992, Congress enacted the Grand Canyon Protection Act 
(“GCPA”) in an effort to consolidate the body of regulations 
governing the Dam’s operations.96  Rather than clarifying priorities 
and sorting out conflicting regulations, the GCPA confused 
matters.  While allowing for a decrease in power generation, the 
GCPA reinforced the water management and hydroelectric 
priorities the Dam was initially meant to serve. 97  At the same time, 
it stated that the dam and water resources should be managed in 
“such a manner as to protect, mitigate adverse impacts to, and 
improve the values for which Grand Canyon National Park and 
Glen Canyon National Recreation Area were established, including 
natural and cultural resources and visitor use.”98  Thus, the GCPA 
does not set priorities among cultural, environmental, and 
recreational interests; nor does it mandate how they should be 
reconciled with water management objectives when the interests 
conflict.  In fact, the GCPA seems to suggest that all demands can 
be met, and that the GCPA should in no way affect water 
allocations or conflict with any federal environmental laws. 
The GCPA did call upon the Secretary of the Interior to prepare 
an EIS evaluating the Dam’s operations; given the uncertainties, 
the GCPA asked the Secretary to take responsibility for long-term 
monitoring of the Dam’s impact so that operations could be 
adjusted over time to account for new information or changed 
94. Robert W. Adler, Restoring the Environment and Restoring Democracy:  Lessons from the 
Colorado River, 25 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 55, 76 (2007). 
95. See, e.g., id. at 84–85. 
96. Grand Canyon Protection Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-575, § 1805, 106 Stat. 4600 
(1992), available at http://www.usbr.gov/uc/rm/amp/legal/gcpa1992.html. 
97. Id.  (“The Secretary shall implement this section in a manner fully consistent with and 
subject to the Colorado River Compact, the Upper Colorado River Basin Compact, the Water 
Treaty of 1944 with Mexico, the decree of the Supreme Court in Arizona v. California, and 
the provisions of the Colorado River Storage Project Act of 1956 and the Colorado River 
Basin Project Act of 1968 that govern allocation, appropriation, development, and 
exportation of the waters of the Colorado River basin.”). 
98. Id. 
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circumstances.99  Presumably, long-term monitoring would 
determine the impacts that management has on “the natural, 
recreational, and cultural resources of Grand Canyon National 
Park and Glen Canyon National Recreation Area.”100  Furthermore, 
the GCPA requires that such monitoring be conducted in 
consultation with various stakeholders, ranging from the governors 
of the affected states to the recreation industry. 
In 1996, Interior Secretary Bruce Babbitt signed the Record of 
Decision (“ROD”) for the EIS.101 More than forty assessments, 
undertaken by fifteen different agencies, were incorporated into 
it.102  Among other things, the ROD mandated the creation of an 
Adaptive Management Working Group (“AMWG”), with various 
stakeholder representatives empowered to make recommendations 
regarding the Dam’s management to the Secretary of the Interior 
in light of changing data and within the boundaries set by the 
relevant rules, regulations, and decisions.103 
C.  The Adaptive Management Program 
The 1996 Record of Decision mandated the creation of the 
AMWG, but did not specify requirements beyond stating that it 
should be chartered in accordance with the Federal Advisory 
Committee Act (“FACA”) to conduct experiments and undertake 
monitoring that might lead to operational changes, provided they 
comply with the National Environmental Policy Act (“NEPA”).104 
In January 1997, Secretary of the Interior Bruce Babbitt signed a 
Charter for the AMWG, which prescribes the following duties for 
the group:  establish operating procedures; advise the Secretary of 
the Interior in meeting the environmental and cultural 
commitments in the EIS Record of Decision; recommend a 
framework for AMP policy, goals, and direction; recommend 
resource management objectives for the long-term monitoring plan 
and any other research required to assess the impact of the Dam’s 
99. Id. 
100. Id. 
101. GLEN CANYON DAM ADAPTIVE MGMT. PROGRAM, U.S. DEP’T OF THE INTERIOR, 
ADAPTIVE MANAGEMENT PROGRAM ORIGINS 1 (2005) [hereinafter AMP ORIGINS], available at 
http://www.gcdamp.gov/fs/amp_orig.pdf. 
102. Id.; see generally FINAL EIS, supra note 13. 
103. Id. 
104. U.S. BUREAU OF RECLAMATION, RECORD OF DECISION:  OPERATION OF GLEN CANYON 
DAM (1996), available at http://www.usbr.gov/uc/rm/amp/pdfs/sp_appndxG_ROD.pdf. 
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operations; contribute to and review the mandated yearly report to 
Congress and relevant state governors; review long-term 
monitoring data to assess whether or not goals are being met and 
make operations and resource management recommendations 
accordingly; and monitor and report on all program activities 
undertaken to confirm that they are in compliance.105 
The Charter also stipulates that the AMWG will report to the 
Secretary of the Interior via his or her designee, who will act as the 
chairperson; that the group is expected to meet biannually; and 
that membership, which is appointed by the Secretary, should 
include, but not be limited to:106 
• The Secretary’s Designee; 
• A representative from each of the twelve government authorities 
associated with the EIS: 
o U.S. Bureau of Reclamation, 
o U.S. Bureau of Indian Affairs, 
o U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service, 
o U.S. National Park Service, 
o Western Area Power Administration, 
o Arizona Game and Fish Department, 
o Hopi Tribe, 
o Hualapai Tribe, 
o Navajo Nation, 
o San Juan Southern Paiute Tribe, 
o Southern Paiute Consortium, and 
o Pueblo of Zuni; 
• A representative from each of the seven Colorado River Basin 
States; and 
• Two representatives each from environmental groups, recreation 
groups, and contractors that purchase power generated by the 
Dam. 
The AMWG first met in September of 1997, and spent the next 
few months establishing itself and proposing operating procedures 
that outline how the group functions.107  Most significantly, these 
105.  GLEN CANYON DAM ADAPTIVE MGMT. WORK GROUP, U.S. DEP’T OF THE INTERIOR, 
GLEN CANYON DAM ADAPTIVE MANAGEMENT WORK GROUP CHARTER (1997) [hereinafter 
WORK GROUP CHARTER], available at 
www.usbr.gov/uc/rm/amp/amwg/mtgs/97sep10/Attach_01.pdf. 
106. Id. 
107. See GLEN CANYON DAM ADAPTIVE MGMT. WORK GROUP, U.S. DEP’T OF THE INTERIOR, 
MINUTES OF SEPT. 10–11, 1997 MEETING (1997) [hereinafter MEETING MINUTES SEPTEMBER 
1997], available at 
http://www.usbr.gov/uc/rm/amp/amwg/mtgs/97sep10/Meeting_Minutes.pdf; GLEN 
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procedures mandate:  Robert’s Rules of Order as the default 
operating manual; the approval of motions through consensus, 
with recourse to passing motions by a two-thirds majority when the 
chair deems consensus impossible; and the confirmation of the 
standing Technical Work Group (“TWG”) as a sub-committee.108 
The TWG, which is comprised of technical representatives from 
each of the groups on the AMWG, is to perform tasks assigned to it 
by the main group.  Tasks include developing “criteria and 
standards for monitoring and research programs,” providing 
“periodic reviews and updates,” “developing resource management 
questions for the design of monitoring and research” by the 
GCMRC, and providing information for “preparing annual 
resource reports and other reports” for the AMWG.109 
The GCMRC was created “to provide credible, objective scientific 
information to the Glen Canyon Dam AMP on the effects of 
operating Glen Canyon Dam under the Record of Decision and 
other management actions on the downstream resources of the 
Colorado River ecosystem, utilizing an ecosystem science 
approach.”110  The GCMRC is part of the U.S. Geological Survey, 
but responds to research questions posed by the AMWG, typically 
through the TWG.111  Independent Review Panels, including the 
Science Advisory Board, independently assess program proposals 
CANYON DAM ADAPTIVE MGMT. WORK GROUP, U.S. DEP’T OF THE INTERIOR, MINUTES OF JAN. 
15–16, 1998 MEETING (1998), available at 
http://www.usbr.gov/uc/rm/amp/amwg/mtgs/98jan15/Final_Minutes.pdf. 
108. GLEN CANYON DAM ADAPTIVE MGMT. WORK GROUP, U.S. DEP’T OF THE INTERIOR, 
FINAL OPERATING PROCEDURES 1, 2, 4 (1998) [hereinafter FINAL OPERATING PROCEDURES], 
available at http://www.usbr.gov/uc/rm/amp/amwg/mtgs/98jul21/Attach_11.pdf.  
Robert’s Rules of Order “were designed to ‘assist an assembly to accomplish in the best 
possible manner the work for which it was designed.’”  LAWRENCE E. SUSSKIND & JEFFREY L. 
CRUIKSHANK, BREAKING ROBERT’S RULES 8 (2006).  “Most versions of the Rules begin with an 
‘Order of Precedence of Motions,’ which defines which kind of motion is more important 
than another, and a ‘Table of Rules Relating to Motions,’ which claims to answer three 
hundred questions about parliamentary practice.”  Id.  See, e.g., HENRY M. ROBERT, ROBERT’S 
RULES OF ORDER (BiblioBazaar 2008). 
109. U.S. Bureau of Reclamation, Glen Canyon Dam Adaptive Management Program 
Technical Work Group, http://www.usbr.gov/uc/rm/amp/twg/twg_index.html (last visited 
Jan. 22, 2010). 
110. U.S. GEOLOGICAL SURVEY, THE ROLE OF THE U.S. GEOLOGICAL SURVEY, GRAND 
CANYON MONITORING AND RESEARCH CENTER IN THE GLEN CANYON DAM ADAPTIVE 
MANAGEMENT PROGRAM 1, available at 
http://www.gcmrc.gov/files/pdf/gcmrc_roles_amp.pdf. 
111. Id. 
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and outcomes to ensure scientific objectivity and credibility.112 
 
 
SOURCE:  Glen Canyon Dam Adaptive Management Program, AMWG 
Membership, http://www.gcdamp.gov/aboutamp/member.html (last 
visited Jan. 22, 2010). 
II.  THE PERSISTENCE OF PROBLEMS AT GLEN CANYON 
Since its creation a decade ago, the AMP has received praise from 
various agency officials and scholars who maintain that the Glen 
Canyon Dam AMP is a successful model of collaborative, adaptive 
regulation and management.113  Despite these accolades and 
considerable funding, a growing number of observers have 
concluded that the Glen Canyon Dam AMP has been far from 
successful.114 
The Glen Canyon Dam AMP should not be considered a success 
 
112. Id. at 1–2. 
113. See, e.g., TECHNICAL GUIDE, supra note 28, at 1; Vicky J. Meretsky et al., Balancing 
Endangered Species and Ecosystems:  A Case Study of Adaptive Management in Grand Canyon, 25 
ENVTL. MGMT. 579 (2000), available at 
http://www.springerlink.com/content/axdga0cfuqfwhh4u/fulltext.pdf; Holly Doremus, 
Adaptive Management, the Endangered Species Act, and the Institutional Challenges of “New Age” 
Environmental Protection, 41 WASHBURN L.J. 50, 78–79 (2001).  See also supra notes 18–21 and 
accompanying text. 
114. See, e.g., Adler, supra note 94; Joseph M. Feller, Collaborative Management of Glen 
Canyon Dam:  The Elevation of Social Engineering Over Law, 8 NEV. L.J. 896 (2008); Camacho, 
Beyond Conjecture, supra note 92. 
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because it has failed to address effectively the concerns that led to 
its creation in the first place, including:  (1) developing a 
stakeholder-supported operating plan responsive to increased 
understanding; (2) averting litigation and other attempts to resolve 
conflict outside of the AMP context; and (3) protecting the 
downstream ecology, including endangered species.115  This Part of 
the article outlines the AMP’s failure to achieve these objectives 
and explains how these failures translate into the persistent 
problems at the Dam. 
A.  There Has Been Little Progress on Formulating a Long-Term 
Plan to Operate the Dam 
Despite more than fifteen years of research and negotiations, the 
Dam operates under the same “modified low fluctuating flows” 
regime as it did in 1996.116  This lack of progress is discouraging 
given the commitment of the AMP and its stakeholders to ongoing 
adaptive management.  Neither Congress nor the AMWG has 
identified measurable goals for the AMP; nor has the AMWG made 
the hard choices needed to prioritize competing uses of the 
Colorado River.  In particular, the Glen Canyon Dam AMP has yet 
to resolve how power generation should be reconciled with 
ecological and other uses that compete for the Dam’s resources.  
For example, evidence from three, well-publicized controlled flood 
experiments indicates that vulnerable species, particularly the 
humpback chub, greatly benefit from seasonal flow changes, yet no 
subsequent changes have been made to long-term operations to 
incorporate such information.117 
The strongest opposition to flow regime change has come from 
power generation interests.  The Colorado River Storage Project 
Act of 1956 mandates the maximization of power generation 
revenues, provided that operations do not impinge on the 
Colorado River Compact or other relevant compacts.118  This 
mandate gives power interests authorization to operate the Dam in 
115. These goals for the AMP are embodied in the Vision and Mission Statement 
approved by the group.  GLEN CANYON DAM ADAPTIVE MGMT. WORK GROUP, U.S. DEP’T OF 
THE INTERIOR, VISION AND MISSION STATEMENT (1999), available at 
http://www.usbr.gov/uc/rm/amp/amwg/mtgs/99oct21/Attach_02.pdf. 
116. Feller, supra note 114, at 916. 
117. Reese, supra note 42; Kubly, supra note 21. 
118. The Colorado River Storage Project Act of 1956, ch. 203 § 7, 43 U.S.C. § 620f (2008). 
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a manner most beneficial to them, subject to other laws.119  
Controlled floods represent lost revenues to the power industry—
an estimated four million dollars in the case of the 2008 
experiment.120  It is still not clear whether power interests will be 
compensated for this loss.  It is unsurprising, given these losses, that 
power interests are opposed to changes in the Dam’s operation. 
The group seems incapable of fashioning creative solutions that 
meet multiple interests.121  By this time, relatively stable voting 
blocks have formed.  Our review of motions voted on since the 
AMWG was created confirms that factions are entrenched:  
environmental organizations, paddlers, the Fish and Wildlife 
Service, and the National Park Service regularly find themselves on 
one side, while the states and power generators are often on the 
other.122 
B.  The AMP Has Been Unable to Avert Unproductive Extra-
Programmatic Conflict 
Lawsuits filed as early as 1973, only ten years after the Dam was 
completed, challenged various resource management decisions.123  
Indeed, it was a legal victory won by environmental groups—
National Wildlife Federation v. Western Area Power Administration124—
119. Id. at ch. 203 § 1, 43 U.S.C. § 620. 
120. Reese, supra note 42. 
121. Id. 
122. Other interest groups, including the tribes, are less predictable, allying with different 
partners depending on the issue.  See, e.g., GLEN CANYON DAM ADAPTIVE MGMT. WORK 
GROUP, U.S. DEP’T OF THE INTERIOR, MINUTES OF SEPT. 9–10, 2008 MEETING (2008), available 
at http://www.usbr.gov/uc/rm/amp/amwg/mtgs/08sep09/Final_Mins_08sep09.pdf 
(documenting that environmental and recreation interests, the National Park Service, and 
two tribes opposed a motion to “direct the Technical Work Group to review the flow 
levels . . . associated with each of the 158 archaeological sites that have been identified” while 
other parties either supported or abstained from acting upon the motion); GLEN CANYON 
DAM ADAPTIVE MGMT. WORK GROUP, U.S. DEP’T OF THE INTERIOR, MINUTES OF AUG. 29–30, 
2007 MEETING (2007), available at 
http://www.usbr.gov/uc/rm/amp/amwg/mtgs/07aug29/Final_Mins.pdf (documenting 
that environment and rafting interests, the Park Service and the Fish and Wildlife Service 
supported a motion to “[recommend] that the Secretary of the Interior implement 
Seasonally-Adjusted Steady Flows in WY 2008” while other parties either opposed or 
abstained from acting upon the motion).  
123. The first lawsuit was Friends of the Earth v. Armstrong, 360 F. Supp. 165 (C.D. Utah 
1973), which sought to force the U.S. Bureau of Interior to keep Lake Powell’s water out of 
Rainbow Bridge National Monument. 
124. See National Wildlife Fed’n v. W. Area Power Admin., No. 88-C-11750 (C.D. Utah 
Sept. 29, 1989) (order granting injunction). 
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1572720
 
SUSSKIND MACRO 3.1.10 3/1/2010  7:45:58 PM 
2010] Adaptive Management in Glen Canyon 27 
 
that led to the creation of the AMP in the first place.  The AMP was 
created to facilitate conflict resolution without resorting to 
litigation.  Under an effective collaborative adaptive management 
program, stakeholders would reflect jointly on what they had 
learned and engage in collaborative problem solving to improve 
the Dam’s operations.  Unfortunately, under the Glen Canyon 
AMP, stakeholders hold fast to their positions and continue to 
spend time and resources challenging each other.  As a result of 
the lack of progress, AMWG members have turned to litigation 
rather than reliance on the AMWG to resolve disputes over dam 
operations. 
In 2006, five environmental organizations sued the Bureau of 
Reclamation over the impacts the Dam continues to have on 
endangered species like the humpback chub.  This suit was settled 
when the Bureau of Reclamation agreed to conduct a new study of 
native fish and habitats in concert with the Fish and Wildlife 
Service.125  The Grand Canyon Trust, an environmental group and 
member of the AMWG, filed a lawsuit against the Bureau of 
Reclamation in December 2007 accusing the agency of managing 
water releases to benefit power generators at the expense of the 
downstream fish habitat.126  In March 2008, the Grand Canyon 
Trust and Earthjustice filed a complaint against the Bureau of 
Reclamation and the Fish and Wildlife Service, alleging 
Endangered Species Act violations.127  United States District Judge 
David Campbell ruled against the Fish and Wildlife Service in May 
2009, requiring the agency to reconsider its approach to evaluating 
the Dam’s impacts on humpback chub. 128 
125. Press Release, Western Environmental Law Center, New Environmental Study on 
Grand Canyon’s Native Fishes and Habitat—Impacts of Glen Canyon Dam (Sept. 5, 2006), 
available at http://www.westernlaw.org/pressroom/press-releases/new-environmental-study-
on-grand-canyons-native-fishes-and-habitat-impacts-of-glen-canyon-dam. 
126. New Suit Filed Over Glen Canyon Dam, DESERET NEWS, Dec. 9, 2007, at B12, available at 
http://www.deseretnews.com/article/1,5143,695234557,00.html. 
127. Supplemental Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief, Grand Canyon Trust 
v. U.S. Bureau of Reclamation and U.S. Fish & Wildlife Serv., No. CV-07-8164-DGC (D. Ariz. 
Mar. 17, 2008); Grand Canyon Trust, The Grand Canyon Trust Sues Reclamation Over ESA, 
NEPA, and GCPA Claims, http://www.grandcanyontrust.org/grand-
canyon/river_actions_litigation.php (last visited Jan. 22, 2010). 
128. Grand Canyon Trust v. U.S. Bureau of Reclamation, 623 F. Supp. 2d 1015, 1043 (D. 
Ariz. 2009); April Reese, FWS Must Reconsider Dam’s Effects on Grand Canyon Chub, LAND 
LETTER, May 28, 2009. 
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C.  The Downriver Ecology is Still in Jeopardy 
In 2008, the Fish and Wildlife Service reiterated that the 
ecosystem below the Dam has been heavily modified from its pre-
dam state.129  Federal agencies are attempting to ameliorate the 
situation by making further flow modifications and removing 
nonnative species, but the changing stream flow (particularly 
coldwater releases and unnatural flow regimes caused by the Dam) 
and land use changes have greatly diminished the species’ 
habitat.130  The humpback chub thrive in warm, sediment-rich flows 
that create fast moving currents, eddies, and associated beach 
formations.131  The Fish and Wildlife Service postulates that, 
historically, humpback chub were found throughout the Grand 
Canyon, while today they are largely confined to a few sections and 
tributaries that remain largely undisturbed by human intervention.  
According to the Fish and Wildlife Service, “[m]any of the physical 
changes in the post-dam Colorado River are believed to have 
contributed to eliminating spawning and recruitment of humpback 
chub in the mainstem river.”132 
The precarious state of the downriver ecology is particularly 
disconcerting because anticipated stressors, such as climate change, 
are likely to strain the ecosystem even further.  Fish and Wildlife 
acknowledges that the effects of climate change should factor into 
how the Dam is operated, as the low reservoir levels associated with 
droughts from 2004 to 2006 demonstrate the potential for climate 
change to impact humpback chub.133  Perhaps more disturbingly, 
recent findings by University of Colorado researchers suggest that 
climate change and population growth could dry up the Colorado 
River’s reservoir by 2057.134  This would profoundly impact human 
settlements, agriculture, and the riverine environment. 
Recent evidence suggests that the humpback chub may have 
temporarily benefitted from recent temporary high-flow releases.  
These releases are byproducts of AMP experiments with various 
129. FINAL BIOLOGICAL OPINION, supra note 23, at 21. 
130. Id. at 16. 
131. Id. at 13–15. 
132. Id. at 22. 
133. Id. at 34. 
134. Lauren Morello, Climate, Population Growth Could Dry Up Colorado River by 2057, 
CLIMATEWIRE, June 21, 2009, available at 
http://www.eenews.net/public/climatewire/2009/07/21/2. 
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flow regimes used to assess the impacts on species populations and 
ecosystem health starting in 1996.135  The U.S. Geological Survey 
(“USGS”) reported in April 2009 that humpback chub populations 
increased by fifty percent between 2001 and 2008, a significant 
recovery after steady declines in the 1990s.136  The USGS 
acknowledges the difficulty of determining why the population 
rebounded, but argues that the experimental water releases are 
probably one factor.137 
One might consider the humpback chub’s recovery to be 
evidence that the AMP is doing its job. After years of research, 
however, debates continue regarding whether or not flow regimes 
should be permanently modified to protect the health of the chub 
population.138  Furthermore, the AMP’s reluctance to adopt a 
modified flow regime or even to continue with high flow tests139 
suggests that any successes attributable to the experimental water 
releases are only temporary and could be erased by the cessation of 
controlled flooding.  Though the DOI recently directed the 
development of a protocol for conducting even more high-flow 
experiments,140 the fact that ongoing dam operations have never 
been formally changed to incorporate the apparent benefits of the 
experimental releases on downriver ecosystems indicates the AMP’s 
limited commitment to adaptive management and jeopardizes the 
ancillary ecological benefits obtained through experimentation. 
III.  THE SHORTCOMINGS OF THE AMP AS A COLLABORATIVE 
ADAPTIVE MANAGEMENT PROGRAM 
The AMP has failed to achieve its potential because it has not 
addressed significant process management questions.  Evidence 
from a diverse range of complex, multi-party regulatory conflicts 
has led scholars and dispute resolution professionals to 
135. U.S. BUREAU OF RECLAMATION, U.S. DEP’T OF THE INTERIOR, BIOLOGICAL ASSESSMENT 
ON THE OPERATION OF GLEN CANYON DAM AND PROPOSED EXPERIMENTAL FLOWS FOR THE 
COLORADO RIVER BELOW GLEN CANYON DAM DURING THE YEARS 2008–2012 14–15 (2007), 
available at http://www.usbr.gov/uc/envdocs/ba/gc-ExpFlow/2007BA.pdf. 
136. ANDERSEN, supra note 60, at 2. 
137. Id. 
138. Reese, supra note 42. 
139. Id. 
140. See News Release, U.S. Dep’t of the Interior, Secretary Salazar Announces Initiative 
to Protect Grand Canyon Resources While Meeting Water Needs (Dec. 10, 2009), 
http://www.doi.gov/news/09_News_Releases/121009c.html. 
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recommend a set of “best practices” for managing environmental 
and land use disputes.141  The Consensus Building Handbook, the 
product of a five-year effort by four dozen of America’s leading 
dispute resolution professionals, reviews these best practices in 
great detail, indicating how properly managed and structured 
group decision-making and joint fact-finding efforts can lead to 
workable agreements.142  Although incorporating the Handbook’s 
practices into a regulatory program does not guarantee full 
resolution of very contentious resource disputes, there is 
considerable evidence that doing so helps foster scientifically 
credible agreements and creative long-term solutions to complex 
resource problems.143  Moreover, mounting evidence suggests that 
both participants and outside observers are more satisfied when 
these practices are followed, even if no final agreement is 
reached.144 
In The Consensus Building Handbook, Susskind and Thomas-
Larmer outline how conflict assessment procedures should be used 
to identify both the relevant stakeholders in a resource 
management dispute and what issues ought to be addressed in 
order to maximize the chance of reaching an informed 
141. See generally THE CONSENSUS BUILDING HANDBOOK (Lawrence Susskind et al. eds., 
1999) [hereinafter Susskind, CONSENSUS BUILDING HANDBOOK] (discussing strategies for 
building consensus); LAWRENCE SUSSKIND ET AL., USING ASSISTED NEGOTIATION TO SETTLE 
LAND USE DISPUTES:  A GUIDEBOOK FOR PUBLIC OFFICIALS (1999) (summarizing beneficial 
practices regarding undertaking conflict assessment, selecting stakeholders, training 
participants, setting an agenda, and establishing an advisory committee based on five case 
studies involving the settlement of land use disputes); PATRICK FIELD ET AL., CONSENSUS 
BUILDING INSTITUTE, INTEGRATING MEDIATION IN LAND USE DECISION MAKING (1999) 
[hereinafter MEDIATION OF LAND USE DISPUTES], available at http://emcenter.org/wp-
content/uploads/2009/10/Integrating%20Mediation%20in%20Land%20Use%20Decision
%20Making_FINAL2.pdf; Judith Innes & David Booher, Stories from the Field, in BEYOND 
COLLABORATION:  PLANNING AND PUBLIC POLICY FOR THE 21ST CENTURY (forthcoming) (on 
file with authors); Judith Innes & David Booher, Collaborative Policymaking:  Governance 
Through Dialogue, in DELIBERATIVE POLICY ANALYSIS 33 (Maarten Hajer & Hendrik Wagenaar 
eds., 2003); DAVID STRAUS, HOW TO MAKE COLLABORATION WORK (2002); DAVID D. CHRISLIP, 
THE COLLABORATIVE LEADERSHIP FIELDBOOK (2002). 
142. See generally Susskind, CONSENSUS BUILDING HANDBOOK, supra note 141. 
143. Kirk Emerson et al., Environmental Conflict Resolution:  Evaluating Performance Outcomes 
and Contributing Factors, 27 CONFLICT RESOL. Q. 27, 57 (2009), available at 
http://www3.interscience.wiley.com/cgi-bin/fulltext/122614996/PDFSTART. 
144. See Camacho, Mustering the Missing Voices, supra note 3, at 304–11; Laura I. Langbein 
& Cornelius M. Kerwin, Regulatory Negotiation Versus Conventional Rulemaking:  Claims, Counter-
Claims and Empirical Evidence, 10 J. PUB. ADMIN. RES. & THEORY 599, 625 (2000); Susskind, 
CONSENSUS BUILDING HANDBOOK, supra note 141, at 4; MEDIATION OF LAND USE DISPUTES, 
supra note 141, at 20–22. 
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agreement.145  Straus enumerates how to facilitate collaborative 
efforts in order to ensure that all participants feel like they have 
had a say in the design of the decision-making process.146  Poirier 
Elliott explains why professional neutrals regularly improve the 
effective management of collaborative decision-making bodies.147  
Potapchuk and Crocker stress the importance of formulating 
agreements that have a clear and accountable pathway to 
implementation.148  Ehrmann and Stinson describe how 
stakeholders ought to engage with technical experts in joint fact-
finding.149 
Prescribing many of the same practices as The Consensus Building 
Handbook, the DOI’s Adaptive Management Technical Guide 
emphasizes the need for group learning and ongoing improvement 
in how to manage collaborative decision-making.150  Unfortunately, 
as detailed below, the DOI has failed to incorporate at least six vital 
practices for achieving truly collaborative and adaptive 
management into the AMP’s design and operation.  As a result, the 
AMP has failed to cultivate meaningful relationships among the 
stakeholders and has failed to develop the multilateral AMWG into 
an effective, deliberative decision-making body. 
The remainder of this article focuses on six best practices that, 
according to our research, the AMP does not utilize:  (1) 
identifying appropriate stakeholder representatives; (2) setting 
clear goals and involving stakeholders in developing a collaborative 
process; (3) using professional neutrals when appropriate and 
committing to building common ground; (4) incorporating joint 
fact-finding to deal with scientific uncertainty; (5) producing 
collectively supported written agreements; and (6) building long-
term adaptive management capabilities. For each best practice, we 
explain why it is central to collaborative adaptive management and 
145. Lawrence Susskind & Jennifer Thomas-Larmer, Conducting a Conflict Assessment, in 
Susskind, CONSENSUS BUILDING HANDBOOK, supra note 141, at 99, 107–30. 
146. David A. Straus, Managing Meetings to Build Consensus, in Susskind, CONSENSUS 
BUILDING HANDBOOK, supra note 141, at 287, 292–321. 
147. Michael L. Poirier Elliott, The Role of Facilitators, Mediators, and Other Consensus 
Building Practitioners, in Susskind, CONSENSUS BUILDING HANDBOOK, supra note 141, at 199, 
212–18. 
148. William R. Potapchuck & Jarle Crocker, Implementing Consensus-Based Agreements, in 
Susskind, CONSENSUS BUILDING HANDBOOK, supra note 141, at 527, 548–51. 
149. John R. Ehrmann & Barbara L. Stinson, Joint Fact-Finding and the Use of Technical 
Experts, in Susskind, CONSENSUS BUILDING HANDBOOK, supra note 141, at 375, 380–91. 
150. TECHNICAL GUIDE, supra note 28. 
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how, in our view, the AMP has failed to implement it successfully. 
A.  Identifying Appropriate Stakeholder Representatives 
Ensuring that all influential and substantially affected parties are 
at the table is critical to the success of any collaborative process.151  
If such a party is not included, the party will likely feel 
unrepresented and might resort to other means to undermine what 
the collaborative process has achieved.152  Furthermore, if such a 
party is not included, the collaborative body might miss out on 
important input that could have contributed to reaching an even 
better agreement.153 
The literature suggests that the best way to identify appropriate 
stakeholder representatives is by commissioning a “conflict 
assessment” in which a professional “neutral” conducts informal, 
not-for-attribution interviews with a first group of stakeholders 
recommended by the convener of the collaborative process.154  As 
part of these interviews, the professional neutral asks the 
stakeholders with whom else he should speak.  The process is 
repeated until all relevant players have been included.  Based on 
these interviews, the neutral then suggests to the convener the 
categories of relevant stakeholder groups and suggests who might 
represent each stakeholder category in a collaborative process.155  
Often, a draft of the neutral’s proposal is circulated to everyone 
who was interviewed before it is submitted to the convener.156 
In the case of the Glen Canyon Dam AMWG, the charter dictates 
certain stakeholder groups who must be at the table and allows the 
Secretary of the Interior to add parties at his or her discretion.157  
Where the charter does not stipulate specific representatives or 
representative organizations for a given stakeholder group, the 
Secretary of the Interior chooses the representative.158  This allows 
151. See Susskind & Thomas-Larmer, supra note 145, at 105. 
152. See id. 
153. Id. 
154. Id. at 100.  A “professional neutral” is one that has expertise and experience in 
helping stakeholders work through a process to resolve an issue, but does not have a direct 
stake in the issue at hand.  The “neutral” should be trusted and ideally chosen by all 
stakeholders.  Id. at 181–84. 
155. Id. at 100–01. 
156. Id. at 130. 
157. WORK GROUP CHARTER, supra note 105, at 3. 
158. Id. 
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the Secretary to choose parties with whom it might be easiest to 
work and exclude significant critics who might later challenge the 
group’s decisions. 
Ultimately, the AMP’s process for determining representation 
was neither complete nor transparent, and likely the unfortunate 
result of lobbying behind closed doors.159  Meeting minutes from 
the initial “Transition Work Group,” which was formed to operate 
until the formal AMWG was constituted, provide surprisingly little 
documentation of discussions about membership.160  Transition 
Work Group members expressed the need for diverse membership 
and for an information-and-training session on membership 
requirements.161  There appears to be no indication in the record, 
however, of how the Secretary of the Interior chose stakeholder 
representatives.162  This lack of transparency raises substantial 
questions regarding the adequacy of AMWG representation and 
ultimately the legitimacy of subsequent AMWG decisions. 
The number or fraction of representatives from various 
categories of stakeholder groups has also been criticized.163  While 
not of critical importance when a group operates by consensus, 
group composition is very important when decisions are made by 
majority or super-majority voting, because such dynamics may lead 
to formation of coalitions that force issues through while ignoring 
minority objections, as has happened with the AMP.  Almost half of 
159. Camacho, Beyond Conjecture, supra note 92, at 959. 
160. GLEN CANYON DAM TRANSITION WORK GROUP, U.S. DEP’T OF THE INTERIOR, SUMMARY 
OF TRANSITION WORK GROUP MEETING, MINUTES OF FEB. 3–4, 1997 MEETING (1997) 
[hereinafter TRANSITION WORK GROUP MEETING FEBRUARY 1997], available at 
http://www.riversimulator.org/Resources/GCDAMP/TWG1997to1999/97.02/Minutes.pdf. 
161. Id. at 5. 
162. Id. at 3–4. 
163. Camacho, Beyond Conjecture, supra note 92, at 958–59 (“Though the [AMWG] is 
reasonably diverse, there is still a question regarding whether the group is sufficiently 
representative.  This is in large part because of the operative rule chosen for voting on 
AMWG decisions.  The AMWG’s operating procedures dictate that ‘[t]he group should 
attempt to seek consensus but, in the event that consensus is not possible, a vote should be 
taken. . . . Approval of a motion requires a two-thirds majority of members present and 
voting . . . . [The] AMWG demonstrates that decisions as to the structure of the regulatory 
program—stakeholder group composition, the adopted decision rule, the convenor’s role in 
decision-making—can function to allow a stakeholder group to suppress meaningful 
participation and collaboration rather than cultivate it . . . . [W]hen the decision rule is less 
than consensus, the exact composition becomes crucial, and the probative value of decisions 
made by such a group is less clear.  There is no clear, objective formula for deciding what 
proportion of votes should be allocated to recreational, hydropower, and environmental 
values and interests, let alone federal agencies, states, and tribes.”). 
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the motions put forward at AMWG meetings between March 2004 
and May 2008 went to a vote.164  Power generation interests have 
been able to garner a majority, and often a two-thirds majority, 
frequently by obtaining the support of the states and sometimes the 
tribes.  For example, a motion to conduct no “Beach/Habitat-
Building Flows” in fiscal year 2005 was narrowly approved by a 
margin of thirteen “yes” votes to six “no” votes and one abstention; 
the meeting minutes suggest that the states teamed up with power 
interests because of their desire to maximize power production.165  
Frustrated with this perceived imbalance against them, 
environmental groups have turned to litigation, which clearly 
undermines the consensus-oriented intention of the AMP 
process.166  In part because the Secretary never invited open 
discussion of which stakeholders should participate and how many 
votes each interest group has,167 the AMWG has fallen short of 
functioning as a collaborative decision-making body for addressing 
the resource conflicts surrounding the Glen Canyon Dam.168  
Instead, as evidenced by a majority of motions bypassing consensus 
in favor of a vote, unbalanced representation has seemingly led 
some parties to conclude that they are better off forcing a vote that 
they can consistently win.169 
B.  Providing Clear Goals and Involving Stakeholders in Developing 
Operating Procedures that Guide the Collaborative Process 
Best practices suggest that all stakeholders ought to have a 
164. See GLEN CANYON DAM ADAPTIVE MGMT. WORK GROUP, U.S. DEP’T OF THE INTERIOR, 
MINUTES OF MAR. 2004–MAY 2008 MEETINGS [hereinafter MEETING MINUTES MAR. 2004–MAY 
2008], available at http://www.usbr.gov/uc/rm/amp/mtgmin.html (select desired meeting 
date from “Select 2006–2010 Meeting Date”; then follow “Draft Meeting Minutes” hyperlink) 
(indicating that thirty-three of sixty-four motions went to a vote during this time period). 
165. See GLEN CANYON DAM ADAPTIVE MGMT. WORK GROUP, U.S. DEP’T OF THE INTERIOR, 
MINUTES OF AUG. 9–11, 2004 MEETING 18 (2004), available at 
http://www.usbr.gov/uc/rm/amp/amwg/mtgs/04aug09/Final_Mins.pdf. 
166. Camacho, Beyond Conjecture, supra note 92, at 959–60. 
167. TRANSITION WORK GROUP MEETING FEBRUARY 1997, supra note 160. 
168. ROLES AD HOC GROUP, GLEN CANYON DAM ADAPTIVE MGMT. WORK GROUP, DRAFT 
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS TO THE SECRETARY’S DESIGNEE 3 (2007) [hereinafter 
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS], available at 
http://www.usbr.gov/uc/rm/amp/amwg/mtgs/07aug29/Attach_13a.pdf. 
169. See id.  See generally MEETING MINUTES MAR. 2004–MAY 2008, supra note 164 
(indicating, for example, that of the five motions calling for modified flow releases during 
this time, four went to a vote with the support of environmental groups but lost by 
substantial margins). 
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chance, before they come to the table, to participate in the design 
of a collaborative process, including setting an agenda, drawing up 
a timetable, deciding how data gathering or fact finding should 
proceed, choosing technical advisors, setting a budget, and, most 
importantly, selecting a neutral facilitator to manage meetings and 
decision-making.170  Existing evidence suggests that active 
stakeholder involvement at an early stage is crucial to fostering a 
workable and productive collaborative process; active stakeholders 
typically take greater ownership of decision making and are more 
likely to craft a process that pleases all affected parties.171  
Accordingly, to establish effective collaborative management, 
Congress must provide clear guidance as to the program’s purposes 
and make stakeholders responsible for effectuating these 
objectives. 
Unfortunately, Congress neither mandated meaningful 
opportunities for stakeholder involvement nor provided clear 
direction as to the goals and structure of the AMP.  Even though 
Congress retains the ultimate authority (and thus responsibility) 
for specifying the AMP’s goals and design, Congress delegated the 
responsibility to the Secretary of the Interior.172  In doing so, 
Congress failed both to set forth clear objectives for the new 
program and to require ample opportunities for active stakeholder 
involvement in refining the goals and crafting the decision-making 
ground rules.  Neither Congress nor the DOI provided participants 
a significant role in establishing the AMP’s mandate or specifying 
its operating procedures.  For example, while members of the 
Transition Work Group were given an opportunity to comment on 
the draft charter introduced by a Bureau of Reclamation 
170. See, e.g., Lawrence Susskind, An Alternative to Robert’s Rules of Order for Groups, 
Organizations, and Ad Hoc Assemblies That Want to Operate by Consensus, in Susskind, CONSENSUS 
BUILDING HANDBOOK, supra note 141, at 3, 39–42, 46 [hereinafter Susskind, An Alternative]. 
171. See SUSSKIND & CRUIKSHANK, supra note 108, at 62–63 (“In [the Consensus Building 
Approach], many more people are called upon to take an active problem-solving role—
doing work that engages them in what’s happening, learning about the problem, and 
working to craft a solution. . . . Involving more people increases the chances that good ideas 
will see the light of day and be dealt with in ways that build consensus.”). 
172. Grand Canyon Protection Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-575, §§ 1801–1809, 106 Stat. 
4600 (1992), available at http://www.usbr.gov/uc/rm/amp/legal/gcpa1992.html.  The 
Secretary was responsible for interpreting the Act and Environmental Impact Assessment 
that followed, and subsequently for the creation of the AMP.  See Glen Canyon Dam Adaptive 
Management Program, Background, http://www.usbr.gov/uc/rm/amp/background.html 
(last visited Jan. 22, 2010). 
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representative, the draft was submitted to the Secretary of the 
Interior in short order with few changes.173  Had Congress and DOI 
followed best practices, stakeholders would have been intimately 
involved in defining operating procedures from the beginning 
rather than simply having the perfunctory opportunity to 
comment.  After the AMWG’s formation, the staff of the Secretary’s 
Designee drafted the AMWG’s operating procedures at the group’s 
behest.174 
The poor manner in which the AMP was designed was partly the 
product of DOI officials’ interpretation of the FACA of 1972.  
Congress passed FACA to enhance the accountability and 
credibility of the various advisory committees created by federal 
agencies.175  While its intentions are laudable and the mechanisms 
it mandates to guide the creation and operation of advisory 
committees foster transparency, its requirements can be restrictive, 
limiting opportunities for committees to craft the most contextually 
appropriate solutions.  Nonetheless, some collaborative processes 
in America governed by FACA have incorporated the 
aforementioned best practices.176 
The design of the AMP further failed to utilize best practices 
because of stipulations that the Secretary of the Interior imposed 
on its design.  Under these stipulations, the Secretary’s designee 
serves as AMP chair and is responsible for establishing agendas, 
finalizing meeting minutes, and defining the outcomes the group 
will seek.177  Extant procedures allow stakeholders to add items to 
the agenda and to speak on them at meetings; permit members of 
the general public to speak; assure that dissenting opinions are 
conveyed to the Secretary in the minutes; and mandate a response 
from the Secretary regarding how recommendations are being 
173. GLEN CANYON DAM TRANSITION WORK GROUP, U.S. DEP’T OF THE INTERIOR, SUMMARY 
OF TRANSITION WORK GROUP MEETING, MINUTES OF MAY 21, 1996 MEETING (1996) (on file 
with authors). 
174. MEETING MINUTES SEPTEMBER 1997, supra note 107, at 3. 
175. See U.S. General Services Administration, Federal Advisory Committee Act, 
Management Overview, 
http://www.gsa.gov/Portal/gsa/ep/contentView.do?contentType=GSA_OVERVIEW&conte
ntId=9673 (last visited Jan. 22, 2010). 
176. See generally Philip J. Harter, Assessing the Assessors:  The Actual Performance of Negotiated 
Rulemaking, 9 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 32 (2000); Lawrence Susskind & G. McMahon, The Theory 
and Practice of Negotiated Rulemaking, 3 YALE J. ON REG. 133 (1985). 
177. FINAL OPERATING PROCEDURES, supra note 108, at 1–4; REPORT AND 
RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 168, at 11. 
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used.178  Even though these procedures provide stakeholders some 
opportunity to participate, they ultimately confine stakeholders to 
the conventional lobbying role and do not constitute a real system 
of power-sharing. 
Consequently, the DOI gives little consideration to the views of 
AMWG members when making important management decisions 
regarding the Glen Canyon Dam.  For example, in January 2008 
the Secretary’s Designee moved forward with a proposed 
experimental test at the Dam without soliciting the AMWG’s 
recommendations.179  Similarly, AMWG members complained there 
was little discussion of the AMP’s fiscal year 2001 budgetary 
allocation (H.R. 4733 of the Energy and Water Development 
Appropriations Bill).  Members claimed, “stakeholders received no 
advance notice from Interior/Reclamation on HR 4733”; there was 
“no AMWG meeting called to discuss and consequently no AMWG 
consensus or recommendation on the proposed bill”; “one 
stakeholder [went] outside the AMP process”; despite being within 
the “institutional home” for the GCMRC, AMWG was “entirely 
omitted” from the Appropriations Bill; and the “Secretary did not 
respond to stakeholders who wrote letters . . . opposing the funding 
cap.”180 
The absence of a clear regulatory mandate and stakeholder 
responsibility for implementing this charge has led to further 
problems.  Beyond stakeholders having little say in how the AMP is 
structured, uncertainty persists around how the AMWG, TWG, 
GCMRC, and the IRP interact as well as what roles and 
responsibilities these AMP components have.181  For example, 
AMWG members have asserted that they should have greater 
influence over the technical work of the GCMRC, while the 
GCMRC counters that it is not accountable to the AMWG.182  
178. FINAL OPERATING PROCEDURES, supra note 108, at 1–4; REPORT AND 
RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 168, at 11. 
179. See Camacho, Beyond Conjecture, supra note 92, at 960 n.102. 
180. GLEN CANYON DAM ADAPTIVE MGMT. WORK GROUP, U.S. DEP’T OF THE INTERIOR, 
MINUTES OF JAN. 11–12, 2001 MEETING 2 (2001), available at 
http://www.usbr.gov/uc/rm/amp/amwg/mtgs/01jan11/Final_Mins.pdf. 
181. See GLEN CANYON DAM ADAPTIVE MGMT. PROGRAM, U.S. DEP’T OF THE INTERIOR, 
STRATEGIC PLAN (2001) [hereinafter STRATEGIC PLAN], available at 
http://www.usbr.gov/uc/rm/amp/pdfs/sp_final.pdf. 
182. See REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 168, at 11.  See also DOWNSTREAM, 
supra note 74, at 6 (“The 1997 Strategic Plan defined adaptive management . . . [but] it is not 
clear whether this definition is widely shared or whether stakeholders and scientists have 
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Procedural confusion has sometimes been accompanied by 
substantive disagreement. The AMP has failed, for example, to 
agree on targets and priorities.183  By failing to delineate clearly the 
functions and duties of different program components, Congress 
and the Secretary of the Interior have not only detached 
stakeholders from management, but have also unwittingly created a 
muddled regulatory structure. 
C.  Committing to Identifying Common Ground and Cultivating 
Consensus 
Collaborative adaptive management is premised on a 
commitment to promoting better understanding among 
stakeholders and seeking to develop shared decision making.  To 
help accomplish this goal, best practices suggest that professional 
neutrals (or neutral teams) often provide value by facilitating or 
mediating the work of multiparty, ad hoc advisory, or collaborative 
planning groups and by identifying and fostering common 
ground.184  Effective facilitation or mediation extends beyond the 
management of face-to-face meetings.  Professional neutrals know 
how to work with parties “away from the table” to help them 
prepare for meetings and to present and defend their views 
effectively.185  Aside from the skill professional neutrals bring to the 
management of group decision-making, evidence suggests that 
their involvement increases the chances that the process will be 
fair.186  Ideally, professional neutrals also have relevant expertise 
similar interpretations, particularly as it applies to Glen Canyon Dam operations and Grand 
Canyon ecosystem management . . . . The operational roles of scientific monitoring and 
research, and of the Center itself, remain unclear.  A balance has not yet been reached 
among the Center’s roles in conducting science programs, managing contracts, managing 
information systems, responding to stakeholder requests, and synthesizing and 
communicating monitoring and research results.”). 
183. See Camacho, Beyond Conjecture, supra note 92, at 949–50 (“Tellingly, after a decade of 
being in existence, ‘quantifiable targets have not been established for AMP goals including 
the AMWG’s priority resources (humpback chub, sediment, and cultural resources)’ . . . . 
Even supporters of the AMWG process concede that there has been and still is substantial 
uncertainty regarding what the function of the AMWG should be in addressing this 
regulatory dispute.”). 
184. See Kirk Emerson et al., The Challenges of Environmental Conflict Resolution, in 
ENVIRONMENTAL CONFLICT RESOLUTION, supra note 6, at 3, 11. 
185. See generally Lawrence E. Susskind, Environmental Mediation and the Accountability 
Problem, 6 VT. L. REV. 1 (1981) (discussing growing importance of mediation in 
environmental disputes). 
186. See Lawrence E. Susskind, Keynote Address:  Consensus Building, Public Dispute 
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that enables them to identify creative options that might meet each 
party’s interests.  Though an outside professional neutral is not 
always needed for a group to work collaboratively,187 in many 
situations outside mediators are more effective, as they are likely to 
be more objective, have the greatest degree of impartiality, and the 
greatest motivation to maintain confidentiality.188 
In its April 2007 Report and Recommendations to the Secretary’s 
Designee, the Roles Ad Hoc Group—an AMWG committee formed 
to review the AMWG’s progress—suggested that the level of 
collaboration between Glen Canyon Dam stakeholders had actually 
fallen since the inception of the AMP process.189  This represents a 
significant failure to bring parties together to develop outcomes 
that are viewed as mutually beneficial, and raises a question about 
how and whether the AMP leadership expected consensus to 
emerge on key questions facing the group. 
As mentioned previously, the Secretary’s designee chairs the 
AMWG.  As a government employee and the Secretary’s 
representative, the designee is not a “neutral.”  Furthermore, no 
designees thus far have been professional mediators, so they might 
lack the skills needed to facilitate the work of a complex and 
politically charged group like the Glen Canyon Dam AMP.  The 
designees, and their positions, have been: 
• Stephen Magnussen, Director, Operations for Reclamation (July 
1997–February 2002); 
• Michael Gabaldon, Director, Policy, Management, and Technical 
Services (February 2002–March 2006); 
Resolution, and Social Justice, 35 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 185, 185–203 (2008) (discussing nexus 
between public dispute resolution and environmental justice concerns). 
187. See Poirier Elliott, supra note 147, at 231 (“Facilitators may more often be drawn 
from within an organization. This is particularly true when disputes spring from within a 
single organization, the issues are relatively clear and demarcated, the facilitator has no 
interest in the outcome of a decision, and the roles and responsibilities of the facilitator are 
clear and well understood by participants.”) (internal citations omitted).  Id. at 233 
(“[Complex substantive issues, relationships, and process], in and of themselves, may not 
require an independent, professional practitioner.”); Susskind, An Alternative, supra note 170, 
at 3, 7–8, 24, 40. 
188. Poirier Elliott, supra note 147, at 231–32. 
189. REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 168, at 3 (“There are several indications 
that the level of collaboration among AMP participants have decreased since the inception 
of the AMP in 1996, including failure of the various AMP groups to reach 
consensus/agreement . . . . The Roles Ad Hoc Group believes that ineffective and possibly 
insufficient collaboration is an underlying cause of contention, litigation threat, diminished 
efficiency, and confused roles within the AMP.”). 
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• Mark Limbaugh, Assistant Secretary, Water and Science (March 
2006–July 2007); 
• Brenda Burman, Deputy Assistant Secretary, Water and Science 
(July 2007–July 2008); 
• Kameran Onley, Assistant Secretary, Water and Science (July 
2008–August 2009); and 
• Anne Castle, Assistant Secretary, Water and Science (August 
2009–present). 
A review of the designees’ biographies confirms that all were 
either career civil servants with technical backgrounds and 
managerial experience or political appointees.190  There is no 
indication that any designee received significant training in dispute 
resolution.  Unsurprisingly, the Roles Ad Hoc Group reported that 
AMWG members perceive a lack of clear communication between 
the designees and the rest of the AMWG.191  The AMP lacked 
facilitation aimed at generating informed consensus. 
Starting in 1999, the AMP used a trained dispute resolution 
professional to help facilitate some of its meetings and to assist the 
AMWG and TWG with strategic planning; however, because the 
individual was a former stakeholder group member, it leaves the 
AMWG vulnerable to claims that the individual was not sufficiently 
neutral.192  While she helped the Secretary’s designee organize, 
190. See U.S. Bureau of Reclamation, Biography of Stephen V. Magnussen, Acting 
Commissioner, http://www.usbr.gov/history/CommissBios/magnussen.html (last visited 
Jan. 22, 2010); U.S. Bureau of Reclamation:  Biography of Michael Gabaldon, Director, 
Technical Resources, 
http://www.usbr.gov/newsroom/presskit/bios/biosdetail.cfm?recordid=50 (last visited Jan. 
22, 2010); Ferguson Group, Biography of Mark Limbaugh, 
http://www.fergusongroup.us/team_biographies.htm#MarkLimbaugh (last visited Jan. 22, 
2010); Press Release, U.S. Bureau of Reclamation, Brenda W. Burman Named Reclamation’s 
Deputy Commissioner for External and Intergovernmental Affairs (June 7, 2006), available at 
http://www.usbr.gov/newsroom/newsrelease/detail.cfm?RecordID=12222; Press Release, 
U.S. Dep’t of Interior, Secretary Kempthorne Names Kameran Onley to Assume 
Responsibilities of Assistant Secretary for Water and Science (July 13, 2007), available at 
http://www.doi.gov/news/07_News_Releases/070713a.html; Memorandum from Ken 
Salazar, Secretarial Designee for the Glen Canyon Dam Adaptive Management Working 
Group, available at 
http://www.usbr.gov/uc/rm/amp/amwg/pdfs/SecDesigneeApptmt.PDF; National Journal, 
Profiles of Decision Makers in the Obama Administration—Anne Castle, 
http://www.nationaljournal.com/decisionmakers/dm/310/ (last visited Jan. 22, 2010). 
191. REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 168. 
192. See GLEN CANYON DAM ADAPTIVE MGMT. WORK GROUP, U.S. DEP’T OF THE INTERIOR, 
MINUTES OF JULY 21–22, 1999 MEETING (1999), available at 
http://www.usbr.gov/uc/rm/amp/amwg/mtgs/99jul21/Final_Minutes.pdf; American 
Rivers, About Us, http://www.americanrivers.org/about-us/ (last visited Jan. 22, 2010) 
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1572720
 
SUSSKIND MACRO 3.1.10 3/1/2010  7:45:58 PM 
2010] Adaptive Management in Glen Canyon 41 
 
plan, and run AMWG meetings, the dispute resolution 
professional’s role in building consensus has also been somewhat 
limited.193  Rather than empowering a professional neutral to devise 
a consensus-based approach to move the stakeholders towards 
outcomes based on “joint gains,” the AMP lodges decision-making 
authority with the Secretary’s designee and grants this individual 
the authority to move a motion to a vote at his or her discretion.194  
Furthermore, the dispute resolution specialist has had almost no 
engagement with stakeholders outside of formal meetings, nor has 
she dealt with other actors as an AMP representative, despite the 
Role Ad Hoc Group’s recognition that such help is needed.195  No 
record in the AMWG minutes suggests that stakeholders played a 
role in reviewing candidates for the facilitator’s job, or in preparing 
the contract that spelled out the terms and conditions of her 
hiring.196  All of these deficiencies suggest that little or no attention 
was given to involving professional neutrals in group decision-
making or more generally to promoting collaborative decision-
making. 
In fact, as structured, the AMWG provides little opportunity for, 
or encouragement of, consensus building.197  For example, 
(stating American Rivers, which the facilitator represented at the July 1999 meeting, is “the 
leading conservation organization standing up for healthy rivers so communities can thrive.  
American Rivers protects and restores America’s rivers for the benefit of people, wildlife, and 
nature.”); see also GLEN CANYON DAM ADAPTIVE MGMT. WORK GROUP, U.S. DEP’T OF THE 
INTERIOR, FINAL MINUTES OF JANUARY 11–12, 2001 MEETING 9 (2001), available at 
http://www.usbr.gov/uc/rm/amp/amwg/mtgs/01jan11/Final_Mins.pdf (detailing 
perceived concerns of bias raised in a performance evaluation survey the facilitator 
conducted in 2000). 
193. REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 168, at 6 (stating that “facilitation and 
mediation expertise [should be used] more broadly throughout the AMP,” including within 
the TWG and outside of the formal process via trips and exercises to build trust and foster 
collaboration). 
194. Camacho, Beyond Conjecture, supra note 92, at 958–59 (“The exact point in time when 
consensus may be established to be impossible—thus paving the way for a super-majority 
vote—is never delineated in the AMWG’s operating procedures.  The Secretary’s Designee, 
not the mediator-facilitator, decides on his or her own option when to switch to a two-thirds 
vote . . . . As there are no time constraints or other detailed protocols governing when to 
seek consensus and when to follow a two-thirds decision rule, the convenor’s discretion 
becomes of critical importance in determining how the AMWG actually functions.”). 
195. REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 168, at 6 (suggesting the need to 
“[u]pdate or develop a charter and operating procedures for all the elements of the AMP 
(AMWG, TWG, GCMRC, and Secretary’s Designee) to reflect a more collaborative 
approach.”). 
196. See generally MEETING MINUTES, supra note 43. 
197. Consensus building can be understood as the longer-term process of building trust 
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participants reached consensus on only half of the motions put 
before the AMWG between March 2004 and May 2008.198  Even 
though consensus is a stated goal of AMWG meetings, the 
Secretary’s designee can simply choose to take a vote at any time, 
meaning that one side can force the motion to a vote when it 
senses it can prevail.199  Since building consensus requires 
significant time and resources,200 quick voting undercuts the 
commitment to consensus and encourages each party to focus on 
building a “winning coalition” rather than searching for a creative 
solution that meets everyone’s interests.201  As the Roles Ad Hoc 
Group recommends, parties need to “establish and agree to a 
common mission/goal for the AMP”;202 the AMP should “create 
incentives for participants to work collaboratively to achieve 
common goals and desired future resources conditions”;203 the 
AMP should “create incentives for participants to work 
collaboratively to achieve common goals and desired future 
resources conditions”;204 and the group should “update or develop 
a charter and operating procedures for all the elements of the AMP 
(AMWG, TWG, GCMRC, and Secretary’s Designee) to reflect a 
more collabor
The rigidity of the AMWG’s procedure for developing agendas 
and structuring meetings—some of which FACA mandates—
inhibits the creativity and flexibility consensus building requires.206  
and understanding between parties so that they start to look for creative mutual gains rather 
than approaching all issues from their narrow entrenched interests.  Consensus does not 
require unanimity, although it usually involves seeking unanimity but settling for 
overwhelming agreement after all parties have had a chance to present their views and 
suggestions.  See generally Susskind, CONSENSUS BUILDING HANDBOOK, supra note 141; 
SUSSKIND & CRUIKSHANK, supra note 108, at 5. 
198. See MEETING MINUTES MAR. 2004–MAY 2008, supra note 164. 
199. FINAL OPERATING PROCEDURES, supra note 108, at 3. 
200. REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 168, at 3 (“[C]ollaborative processes are 
frequently expensive and time consuming, especially in resolving issues where conflict is 
extensive.”). 
201. Lawrence E. Susskind & Larry Crump, Introduction—Multiparty Negotiation:  Theory 
and Practice of Public Dispute Resolution, in 2 MULTIPARTY NEGOTIATION:  THEORY AND PRACTICE 
OF PUBLIC DISPUTES RESOLUTION vii–xii (2008). 
202. REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 168, at 4. 
203. Id. at 5. 
204. Id. 
205. Id. at 6. 
206. See FINAL OPERATING PROCEDURES, supra note 108, at 2–3 (“The maker of a motion 
must clearly and concisely state and explain his or her motion.  Motions may be made 
verbally or submitted in writing in advance of the meeting . . . . After a motion there should 
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1572720
 
SUSSKIND MACRO 3.1.10 3/1/2010  7:45:58 PM 
2010] Adaptive Management in Glen Canyon 43 
 
The AMWG’s procedures more closely resemble those of a formal 
body following Robert’s Rules of Order than those of a more 
informal, problem-solving group following a consensus-based 
approach.207  In fact, the group explicitly agreed early on to follow 
Robert’s Rules, while allowing for some flexibility.208 
Frustration caused by some groups’ ability to get their way 
without having to seek broad consensus has inevitably led to a loss 
of faith in the process among those who regularly find themselves 
on the losing side.209  We attribute this in part to a failure to 
commit to the best practices associated with consensus building, 
particularly the appointment of a professional neutral selected by 
the full group.  As noted previously, in the absence of a 
commitment to consensus building, the parties have turned to 
other tactics, primarily litigation. 
D.  Establishing and Following Clear Joint Fact-Finding Procedures 
Disagreements about “the facts” are critical to many disputes.  
Each party has its own understanding of what is happening on the 
ground and typically amasses evidence to substantiate and 
reinforce its own perceptions.  In many situations, one side hires 
technical experts to prove they are right.  Of course, other parties 
view such findings with skepticism, and, when they can afford to, 
hire their own technical experts to contradict the other side’s 
experts. 
Joint fact-finding (“JFF”)—a best practice that suggests data 
be presentations by staff followed by a discussion and a call for questions.  The public will be 
given opportunity to comment during the question period as allowed by the 
Chairperson . . . . The group should attempt to seek consensus but, in the event that 
consensus is not possible, a vote should be taken.  Voting shall be by verbal indication or by 
raised hand.  Approval of a motion requires a two-thirds majority of members present and 
voting.”). 
207. The AMWG generally adheres to Robert’s Rules of Order.  See FINAL OPERATING 
PROCEDURES, supra note 108, at 1.  For a contrast between Robert’s Rules and a consensus-
based approach, see SUSSKIND & CRUIKSHANK, supra note 108. 
208. MEETING MINUTES SEPTEMBER 1997, supra note 107, at 4–5. 
209. Camacho, Beyond Conjecture, supra note 92, at 959–60 (“[A]n AMWG’s ad hoc 
committee concluded that ‘some stakeholders feel disenfranchised because some interests 
have more representation on the group; this is especially significant when consensus is not 
achieved and issues get resolved by a vote.’ . . . [S]takeholders consistently in the minority 
are increasingly seeing little incentive to expend their limited resources in a process that 
consistently ignores them, turning instead to costly litigation to address issues the AMWG has 
not confronted.”). 
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ought to be gathered jointly—provides a way to move beyond such 
stalemates.210  When engaged in JFF, parties work together to 
identify what they need to know and to select independent experts 
that they all agree are credible.211  After working together with the 
experts to design the relevant research and reviewing the 
preliminary findings together, the parties might interpret the 
expert’s findings differently, but they will have little reason to reject 
the legitimacy of the data that has been collected.212  By moving 
beyond disagreements about data, the parties can address more 
substantive issues, like the significance of the data and the 
appropriate responses to it.213 
Of course, uncertainty may persist under JFF, and new data will 
affect the parties’ understandings of the issue; however, the aim of 
JFF is not to develop an absolutely conclusive set of facts, but rather 
to reach tentative agreement on the facts at a given time in the 
process and to allow for collaborative research and subsequent 
evolution in management as more is learned.214  Indeed, adaptive 
management is premised on the notion of recurring monitoring 
and research, and adaptation to new information.215  Effective 
adaptive management programs do not pretend to have all of the 
answers, nor do they allow uncertainty to cripple decision-making; 
rather, they facilitate agreement on what is known and unknown at 
a given point, what decisions should be made in light of this 
information, and what information should be collected moving 
forward.216 
To the AMP’s credit, the parties do have the ability to craft 
research questions through the TWG, and unlike other 
experimental initiatives like the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service’s 
Habitat Conservation Plan program,217 the AMP includes a well-
210. Ehrmann & Stinson, supra note 149, at 375–99; Lawrence Susskind et al., Integrating 
Scientific Information, Stakeholder Interests, and Political Concerns, in INTEGRATED RESOURCE AND 
ENVIRONMENTAL MANAGEMENT:  CONCEPTS AND PRACTICE 181 (D. Scott Slocombe & Kevin S. 
Hanna eds., 2007). 




215. TECHNICAL GUIDE, supra note 28, at v. 
216. See generally Lee, Appraising Adaptive Management, supra note 28, at 3; ADAPTIVE 
ENVIRONMENTAL MANAGEMENT:  A PRACTITIONER’S GUIDE (Catherine Allen & George Henry 
Stankey eds., 2009). 
217. See Camacho, Can Regulation Evolve?, supra note 3, at 337. 
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funded scientific monitoring and research apparatus—the 
GCMRC.  The GCMRC is responsible for most of the research used 
by the AMWG, either directly or indirectly.  Its mission is “[t]o 
provide credible, objective scientific information to the Glen 
Canyon Dam Adaptive Management Program on the effects of 
operating Glen Canyon Dam on the downstream resources of the 
Colorado River ecosystem, utilizing an ecosystem science 
approach.”218 
If the AMP were to provide clear guidance establishing the 
GCMRC’s scientific neutrality while giving the AMWG the authority 
and responsibility to identify research priorities, this would enable 
the GCMRC to have the rare capacity to assist the AMWG in 
making long-term resource management decisions; however, such 
guidance has not been forthcoming.  Neither Congress nor the 
DOI has provided clear direction regarding the goals of the AMP 
or the “chain of command” between the AMWG and the 
GCMRC.219  As a result, GCMRC officials claim that the AMWG has 
failed to provide clear guidance to the GCMRC on the scientific 
questions that the GCMRC should investigate.220  On the other 
hand, some AMWG members have claimed that the GCMRC 
remains purposefully ignorant of their needs.221  As an arms-length 
government body, the GCMRC is responsible for providing data to 
the AMWG and TWG, but is not under the AMWG and TWG’s 
direction.222  Since all GCMRC staff are government employees or 
contractors, AMWG and TWG members have little or no say about 
whom the GCMRC hires on contract or what their work shall 
entail.223 
The AMP has used Independent Review Panels to make fact-
finding efforts more objective and credible, but like the GCMRC, 
these panels are not directly associated with the AMWG.  The 
218. Glen Canyon Monitoring and Research Center, About GCMRC, 
http://www.gcmrc.gov/about/ (last visited Jan. 22, 2010). 
219. Camacho, Beyond Conjecture, supra note 92, at 949–53. 
220. Id. at 955 n.77. 
221. REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 168, at 18 (“Some feel the GCMRC does 
not want to be responsive to the needs of the AMP. . . . Some AMP members feel that 
GCMRC appears to have made unilateral changes in approved documents, work plans, and 
budgets without communicating with AMWG, which has reduced the level of trust between 
AMP members and GCMRC.”). 
222. REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 168, at 9. 
223. Id. at 17–22. 
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panels, which include a Science Advisory Board comprised of 
respected academic experts, assess and monitor the credibility of 
GCMRC program proposals and outputs.224  Yet, because the panels 
are set up by and report to the GCMRC, their reviews are not 
responsive to the interests and concerns of the AMP’s stakeholders.  
Furthermore, some AMWG members argue that advisory board 
members are not forthright in their criticism out of fear of 
offending the research center and their contract staff, thereby 
putting them at risk of losing future work.225 
The panels and the GCMRC are convened on the premise that 
distinguished experts can add legitimacy to the regulatory process 
at Glen Canyon Dam because these experts stand above the 
political fray.  Even so, though scientists regularly provide crucial 
information that can help resolve natural resource disputes—
including assessments of the potential tradeoffs of alternative 
strategies—technical analysis should only inform, and not dictate, 
political decision-making.226  By allowing the GCMRC and 
independent review panels to operate without being responsive or 
accountable to the AMWG, Congress and the Department of the 
Interior severely crippled the AMWG’s ability to manage 
uncertainty regarding the questions central to the Dam’s 
management.  Because scientists alone cannot provide definitive 
and objective answers on the priorities for management or an 
optimal resolution of policy tradeoffs, stakeholders must be 
engaged in defining researchable questions and analyzing the 
results of any technical studies undertaken. 
The dispute surrounding the AMP’s much-publicized 
experimental flood releases exemplifies the prolonged and 
unproductive conflicts that result from the AMP’s inadequate fact-
finding procedures.  The GCMRC has conducted a variety of 
experiments to understand the Dam’s impacts on the downstream 
224. U.S. GEOLOGICAL SURVEY, supra note 110. 
225. REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 168, at 25 (“Some believe that the 
Science Advisors (SAs) do not always forward clear critiques, . . . comments, and 
recommendations because they may not want to offend GCMRC and contract scientists.  
However, the lack of clarity causes difficulty among managers in resolving a course of 
action.”). 
226. N. LeRoy Poff et al., River Flows and Water Wars:  Emerging Science for Environmental 
Decision-Making, 1(6) FRONTIERS IN ECOLOGY & ENVT. 298, 301–02 (2003), available at 
http://www.esajournals.org/doi/pdf/10.1890/1540-
295(2003)001%5B0298:RFAWWE%5D2.0.CO%3B2?cookieSet=1. 
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ecosystem as well as to test out various flow regimes.227  Many of 
these experiments have involved releasing different volumes of 
water over different time periods and evaluating the results.228 
Because AMWG members have had less input in crafting the 
research program than they would in a true joint fact-finding 
process, stakeholder criticism of how research has been conducted 
is inevitable.  The most controversial issues during these tests have 
included:  interpreting the impacts of high-flow releases on the 
river, beach development, and conditions for indigenous species 
and the trout fishery; deciding what experiments should be 
conducted and when; deciding how such impacts should be 
measured; and agreeing on what the ideal outcome should be.229  
For example, at the August 2007 AMWG meeting, an 
environmental representative voiced concern that the monitoring 
and research plan did not represent a true ecosystem approach.230  
At the April 29–30, 2009 meeting, the states and power interests 
voted against a motion to conduct high flow experiments in fiscal 
year 2010–11, ostensibly because they felt that the results of the 
2008 high flow experiment should be interpreted first.231  Though 
stakeholders might criticize research even under a joint fact-finding 
process, the failure to include stakeholders in shaping the research 
agenda unnecessarily increased the potential for conflict and 
delegitimized the data-gathering process. 
Because they were peripheral to the research program’s design, 
stakeholders also have not treated the research findings as tools for 
facilitating joint problem solving, but rather used them as 
ammunition to advance their own positions.  For example, at the 
227. FINAL ENVIRONMENTAL ASSESSMENT, supra note 51, at 3–6. 
228. Id. 
229. See generally MEETING MINUTES, supra note 43. 
230. FINAL MEETING MINUTES AUGUST 2007, supra note 64, at 4. 
231. FINAL MEETING MINUTES APRIL 2009, supra note 52, at 12–13.  “[T]he 
[Environmental Assessment] and the [Biological Assessment] both are pretty specific about 
what additional work needs to be done before more . . . High Flow Experiments or 
Beach/Habitat-Building Flows, are to be conducted and there is a requirement in the EA 
that full scientific and public analysis of the 2008 experiment be completed.  There is 
language to that effect in the BA that says there will be the development of predictive and 
other analytic tools to inform future tests before they’re done and that there will not be a 
proposal to do additional high flow tests until the information from the 2008 HFE is fully 
analyzed . . . .  And as we know from the presentations yesterday . . . some of that won’t be 
completed until the end of fiscal year 2010.”  Id. at 12.  Despite this opposition, the Secretary 
of the Interior recently directed the development of a protocol for conducting further 
experimental high flows.  See News Release, U.S. Dep’t of the Interior, supra note 140. 
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April 2009 meeting, rafting and endangered species advocates cited 
the success that modified flow regimes had in restoring sandbars as 
reason to lobby for their long-term use.232  Since high-flow releases 
appear to provide habitats for endangered species, the AMP may 
continue to use such releases to comply with the Endangered 
Species Act.233  Hydropower interests, on the other hand, cite 
significant revenue losses and problems with meeting electricity 
demand when flows are not regulated based on power needs.234  
Thus, they advocate maintaining the status quo of traditional 
release patterns, which maximize power generation revenues.235 
A well-designed JFF process would not eliminate such arguments.  
It would, however, require each stakeholder to acknowledge those 
aspects of its policy advice that are based on fact and those that 
reflect subjective judgments or wishful thinking.  As each group 
advocates a particular policy choice, the factual bases for its 
prescriptions would be clear to all sides. 
AMP stakeholders have also used the absence of a clearly 
delineated fact-finding process as a delay tactic.236  Uncertainty can 
never be fully eliminated, but parties who benefit from the status 
quo demand that changes be made based only on selective 
information and perpetuate claims of uncertainty by challenging 
the results of experiments.237  A clear joint fact-finding process 
could help limit opportunities for delay and other adversarial, self-
seeking behavior on the part of stakeholders by managing 
uncertainty, moving the process toward agreement on the 
232. FINAL MEETING MINUTES APRIL 2009, supra note 52, at 12–13. 
233. FINAL BIOLOGICAL OPINION, supra note 23, at 23. 
234. FINAL MEETING MINUTES APRIL 2009, supra note 52, at 14. 
235. See generally MEETING MINUTES, supra note 43.  For example, during the August 2004 
meeting, the following was raised:  “Anything that can be done to lessen the impact to the 
basin fund would be good.  Given the drought conditions, it may be better to go to existing 
powerplant conditions and provide a bridge so as to not impact the basin fund.  He added 
that they may be putting the AMP in jeopardy if they ask for money from Congress and then 
let money out of the fund when money could be generated by the power revenues.”  FINAL 
MEETING MINUTES AUGUST 2004, supra note 43, at 17.  Similarly, challenges from 
stakeholders who claim the tests are not worth their environmental impacts and that the tests 
may contravene the Law of the River undermine the usefulness of these experiments.  For 
example, a motion to implement seasonally-adjusted steady flows in 2008 was opposed by an 
AMWG member on the grounds that reduced power generation might lead to more 
greenhouse gas emitting coal-fired power generation.  FINAL MEETING MINUTES AUGUST 
2007, supra note 64. 
236. See Reese, supra note 42. 
237. Id. 
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legitimacy of the underlying data, and providing a framework for 
constantly improving that data.238 
In short, the AMP can and should implement a joint fact-finding 
process.  The stakeholder-comprised TWG has the capacity to 
formulate researchable questions, and the GCMRC has the 
resources and objectivity to play a major role in conducting and 
managing the research process.  Effective joint fact-finding remains 
elusive, however, due to the lack of stakeholder support and the 
absence of a clear relationship between the AMWG and the 
GCMRC.  As a result, factual conflict is often the main issue 
between stakeholders, preventing the AMP from focusing its energy 
on collaborative decision making. 
E.  Producing Collectively Supported and Functional Written 
Agreements 
Best practices suggest that a collaborative process, especially one 
that is explicitly designed to generate decisions, should produce a 
text used for negotiation that all parties can ultimately sign and 
that spells out agreements that have been reached along with 
commitments the parties have made.239  Preparing minutes or 
summaries of meetings does not suffice.  Rather, drafting possible 
terms of a written agreement in the process of negotiating 
“provides a record of discussions” and “reduc[es] the chance of 
later misunderstanding.”240  A written record of discussions should 
also include places for the parties to indicate their personal 
commitments to help implement what has been worked out, 
regardless of whether they have the legal authority to enter into 
enforceable contracts.241 
In the case of Glen Canyon Dam, the stakeholders have not 
developed written agreements that address the core issues before 
238. Ehrmann & Stinson, supra note 149, at 376 (“Joint fact-finding is a central 
component of many consensus building processes; it extends the interest-based, cooperative 
efforts of parties engaged in consensus building into the realm of information gathering and 
scientific analysis.  In joint fact-finding, stakeholders with differing viewpoints and interests 
work together to develop data and information, analyze facts and forecasts, develop common 
assumptions and informed opinion, and . . . reach decisions together.”). 
239. LAWRENCE SUSSKIND & JEFFREY CRUIKSHANK, BREAKING THE IMPASSE:  CONSENSUAL 
APPROACHES TO RESOLVING PUBLIC DISPUTES 14–34 (1987). 
240. ROGER FISHER ET AL., GETTING TO YES:  NEGOTIATING AGREEMENT WITHOUT GIVING 
IN 172 (2d ed. 1991). 
241. SUSSKIND & CRUIKSHANK, supra note 108, at 134. 
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the AMP.  The AMP has adopted a strategic plan that includes a 
mission statement and lists a range of goals for the Colorado River 
ecosystem.242  Despite this, many of the “desired resource 
conditions” stated in the strategic plan are not necessarily 
compatible.  For example, it is far from clear that the goals (1) 
“[to] maintain or attain viable populations of existing native fish, 
remove jeopardy from humpback chub and razorback sucker, and 
prevent adverse modification to their critical habitat” and (2) “[to] 
[m]aintain power production capacity and energy generation, and 
increase where feasible and advisable, within the framework of the 
Adaptive Management ecosystem goals” can be achieved 
simultaneously.243  The strategic plan outlines the positions and 
roles of the various stakeholders and program components, 
introduces the boundaries set by relevant legislation, and notes that 
conflicts may emerge between efforts to meet the various goals.244  
However, the strategic plan offers no guidance as to how to 
reconcile these conflicts.  Because of its focus on integrating 
research findings into management decisions, the strategic plan 
seems to expect that conflicts can be overcome with more and 
better information.245 
While accurate and generally-accepted facts are needed, even the 
best joint fact-finding cannot overcome inherently conflicting uses 
of the same limited resource.  As a result of these limitations, the 
Roles Ad Hoc Group found that the underlying conflicts among 
the listed goals have not been resolved, that no quantifiable targets 
had been established for any of the AMP’s goals, and that many 
stakeholders had “never committed to defining or achieving 
specific resources objectives or desired future resource 
conditions.”246  Rather than spending time on these fundamental 
issues, the AMWG has focused instead on “the details of the AMP, 
sometimes duplicating TWG efforts.”247  Again, this failure can at 
least in part be attributed to Congress’s failure to clarify program 
goals and the relative status of resource uses under the GCPA.248 
The AMWG has also been ineffective because the parties have 
242. See STRATEGIC PLAN, supra note 181, at 10–11. 
243. Id. at 11. 
244. Id. at 2–7. 
245. Id. at 44. 
246. REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 168, at 5. 
247. Id. at 8. 
248. See supra Part III.B. 
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never agreed on how AMWG recommendations will be factored 
into decision-making by the Secretary of the Interior.  After each 
AMWG meeting, the Secretary’s designee unilaterally prepares a 
“formal summary report” for the Secretary and sends copies to 
participants without providing any opportunity for participants to 
comment.249  Although the designee must represent dissenting 
opinions to the Secretary when consensus is not reached, the 
designee remains free to interpret the outcomes and report in the 
manner he or she wishes.  The Secretary, in consultation with 
agency management, is the sole decision maker on how AMWG 
recommendations are incorporated into formal actions;250 the only 
stipulation is that the Secretary’s decisions be reported back to 
AMWG members.251  Members have expressed concern regarding 
the lack of communication and the opaque manner in which 
decisions are made.252  Responses from the Secretary are rare and 
vary widely in their substantive detail.253  Because AMWG members 
have no ownership of and make no commitment to the agreements 
reached, and the Secretary is completely free to make decisions 
with no accountability to the group, stakeholders have incentives to 
circumvent the collaborative process and lobby the Secretary or 
others directly.254 
F.  Managing the AMP Adaptively and Cultivating Long-Term 
Capacity Building 
Best practice suggests that adaptive resource management is a 
long-term task that requires the building of ongoing institutional 
249. FINAL OPERATING PROCEDURES, supra note 108, at 2. 
250. See STRATEGIC PLAN, supra note 181, at 44. 
251. Id. 
252. REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 168, at 11. 
253. Compare Memorandum from Deputy Secretary of the Interior Lynn Scarlett to Glen 
Canyon Dam Adaptive Management Work Group (May 21, 2007), available at 
http://www.usbr.gov/uc/rm/amp/amwg/mtgs/07may22CC/Attach_07.pdf (containing 
itemized responses to each recommendation the AMWG submitted), with Memorandum 
from Secretary of the Interior Gale Norton to Glen Canyon Dam Adaptive Management 
Work Group (Mar. 3, 2006), available at 
http://www.usbr.gov/uc/rm/amp/amwg/mtgs/06mar07/Attach_02b.pdf (introducing 
restructuring within the Department as it relates to the AMP, but providing neither 
explanations as to how this will impact AMWG members, nor responses to recent 
recommendations). 
254. See Camacho, Beyond Conjecture, supra note 92, at 950–52. 
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and organizational capacity.255  Adaptive management should 
include not only systematic monitoring, assessment, and adaptation 
in response to individual regulatory decisions made by the 
stakeholder group, but also reconsideration of the regulatory 
program itself.256  This approach allows the convener, the 
stakeholders, and the broader public to evaluate a program’s 
progress toward meeting public goals, and enhances the 
institutional capacity to follow through on commitments that have 
been made.  Further, a long-term oriented approach helps ensure 
that the group learns from mistakes and gets better at dealing with 
each successive round of adjustments required in an on-going 
adaptive management process. 
Despite the AMP’s asserted emphasis on adaptation, the program 
has failed to engage in genuine adaptive natural resource 
management—both in its concrete decisions concerning resource 
allocation and in how it manages the AMP itself.  For example, 
though the AMP’s highly publicized experimental flood releases 
from the Glen Canyon Dam have been much celebrated, they are, 
in fact, examples of missed opportunities to engage in adaptive 
natural resource management.  The floods certainly provided the 
AMP with important scientific data about the Colorado River’s 
downstream hydrology and ecosystems, but the information gained 
did not modify operations at Glen Canyon Dam.  In other words, 
there was no adaptive management.  To date, a decade after the 
establishment of the AMP, no adjustments to long-term 
management operations of the Dam have been made.257 
The Secretary of the Interior recently directed the development 
of a protocol for conducting additional experimental high flows.258  
Unfortunately, this new release regime seems to signal that the 
program will not be relying on the short-term releases primarily as 
iterative experiments for making long-term management decisions 
about Dam operating criteria but rather as tools for engaging in 
stop-gap natural resource management.  While perhaps more 
favorable for the downriver ecosystem than the current low flow 
regime, such an approach does not demonstrate a rigorous 
255. See Christopher W. Moore & Peter J. Woodrow, Collaborative Problem Solving within 
Organizations, in Susskind, CONSENSUS BUILDING HANDBOOK, supra note 141, at 591, 591–630. 
256. Camacho, Can Regulation Evolve?, supra note 3, at 342–44. 
257. Reese, supra note 42; Camacho, Beyond Conjecture, supra note 92, at 957. 
258. See News Release, U.S. Dep’t of the Interior, supra note 140. 
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commitment to adaptive management. 
In addition to failing to commit to using the information gleaned 
from regulatory experiments to adjust long-term management 
protocols at Glen Canyon Dam, little or no attention is being paid 
to building the AMWG’s and AMP’s long-term capacity.  The only 
attempt to assess the AMP’s progress was to form the Roles Ad Hoc 
Group.  However, the Roles Ad Hoc Group’s recommendations for 
improving the AMP have been neither adopted nor formally 
rejected by either the AMWG or the DOI.259  Furthermore, 
stakeholder representatives have identified technical weaknesses 
and difficulties in meeting the AMP’s participatory requirements, 
but the DOI has provided no training or organizational 
development investments in response.260 
Programmatic evaluations are necessary to foster ongoing 
improvements, but the AMP has failed to commit the resources 
needed.  While some efforts have been made to enhance meeting 
management, there has been no effort to systematically evaluate 
the process or to even monitor it on a regular basis.261  The 
National Research Council has suggested that an adaptive 
management specialist—someone who can help parties deal with 
the tension between research and policy decisions—is sorely 
lacking and would be invaluable.262  Without incorporating a 
systematic approach to monitoring and adapting the program, the 
agency, stakeholders, Congress, and the public are crippled in their 
259. Camacho, Beyond Conjecture, supra note 92, at 950 n.50. 
260. REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 168, at 13.  “Some TWG members 
appear to lack technical training that would enhance their contribution toward success of 
the group.”  Id.  “Many TWG members are unwilling or unable to fully participate in work 
efforts required to meet deadlines and commitments.”  Id. at 15. 
261. Camacho, Beyond Conjecture, supra note 92, at 955–56 (“[While] the AMP does 
incorporate an experimentalist approach to resource management that attempts to monitor, 
evaluate, and adjust regulatory decisions during implementation, Congress, the Secretary, 
and the AMWG have not developed a similar feedback mechanism at a more macroscopic, 
programmatic level:  to monitor, evaluate, and adjust the regulatory program in response to 
information gleaned as the AMP has aged over the past decade . . . . The AMP does not 
systematically monitor and evaluate whether the regulatory program’s processes are being 
effective at achieving program goals.  Straightforward but valuable information about the 
activities of the AMWG are simply not compiled.  How often are AMWG recommendations 
based on a consensus?  On a super-majority vote?  How often are AMWG recommendations 
adopted by the Secretary?  This and more information would undoubtedly be useful in 
assessing the effectiveness of the AMP’s regulatory framework in achieving meaningful 
participation and resource management, and even perhaps reinforcing the accountability of 
the regulatory actors to Congress and the public.”). 
262. DOWNSTREAM, supra note 74, at 59–61. 
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1572720
 
SUSSKIND MACRO 3.1.10 3/1/2010  7:45:58 PM 
54 COLUMBIA JOURNAL OF ENVIRONMENTAL LAW [Vol. 35:1 
 
ability to assess and improve the AMP as the program matures. 
CONCLUSION 
Despite the best of intentions and the availability of considerable 
resources, the Glen Canyon Dam AMP has failed to bring 
stakeholders together to jointly increase their understanding of the 
Colorado River and make useful, broadly supported resource 
management recommendations.  The management of the Dam has 
not reflected an informed consensus on either scientific or non-
technical questions, and has left the humpback chub and other 
species and habitats at risk.  The AMP has not evolved into an 
increasingly competent joint management body; rather, it still plays 
an uncertain advisory role to the Secretary of the Interior.  
Fundamentally, the failure of the AMP stems from questionable 
decisions by Congress and the Secretary of Interior regarding the 
AMP’s design and operation. 
A better CAM process requires government authorities to adopt 
clear enabling authority that establishes the goals of the program 
and makes stakeholders responsible for progressing toward these 
objectives.  Had Congress and the DOI focused on developing a 
successful dispute resolution process, the AMP would have been 
better positioned to: 
1) Identify the various interest groups that should be involved and 
their interests;263 
2) Ensure that the relevant federal and state agencies understand 
and respect the interests of the non-governmental stakeholders 
involved; 
3) Understand and clarify the priorities that ought to be attached to 
the competing national interests at stake in the management of 
the Colorado River, the Dam, and the surrounding area and 
determine how to reconcile these interests; and 
4) Encourage joint fact finding and, based on the findings of its 
scientific advisory groups, agree on a set of adaptive management 
experiments that would help the AMP gain better information, 
manage uncertainty, and learn over time how to improve at 
resource management. 
The Glen Canyon Dam AMP shows that a stated commitment to 
collaboration and adaptive management is insufficient.  Effective 
joint management of natural resources can only be realized 
263. Susskind & Thomas-Larmer, supra note 145. 
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through careful attention to the design and implementation of 
appropriate problem-solving and adaptive-management 
procedures.  It also requires the development of an appropriate 
organizational infrastructure that promotes stakeholder dialogue 
and agency learning.  Though the experimental Glen Canyon Dam 
AMP is far from a success of collaborative adaptive management, 
the lessons from its shortcomings can foster more effective CAM in 
the future by Congress, federal agencies, and local and state 
authorities.  Should legislators and regulators learn to build more 
robust collaborative and adaptive institutions from the Glen 
Canyon Dam experience, the legacy of the Glen Canyon Dam AMP, 
which has been underwhelming thus far, might be well worth the 
wait. 
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